成唯識論演祕 1.621

1.621

簡異餘德名唯眼所取，色依一實名為一依。故彼論云：聲、觸、色、味、香各一根所取，色、味、香等皆依一實，然眼取時要多微合，方為其境。今談其色，體依一實非一依，色即眼能取。故彼論云：色、香、味等若依極微及二微果，名非現量。若一依色即眼能取，何非現境？眼等所得皆現量故。或據其體是眼所取一依名色，不是許眼取一微色。

Distinguishing it from other qualities, it is called 'apprehended solely by the eye'; form relying on a single substance is called 'residing in a single substratum'. Thus that treatise states: 'Sound, tangible, visible form, taste, and odor are each apprehended by a single faculty; visible form, taste, odor, and so on all rely on a single substance.' However, when the eye apprehends it, it requires the aggregation of many atoms before becoming its object. Now discussing visible form, its entity relies on a single substance, but it is not that a single substratum of form can be apprehended by the eye. Therefore, that treatise says: 'If visible form, odor, taste, and so forth rely on single atoms or on two-atom products, they are called non-direct perception.' If a single substratum of form could be apprehended by the eye, why would it not be an object of direct perception? For everything acquired by the eye and so on is direct perception. Or, this is based on its entity being visible form apprehended by the eye and residing in a single substratum, not granting that the eye apprehends the form of a single atom.