成唯識論演祕 1.783

1.783

詳曰：若不言「簡法違有法可自語違」，「有法」言汝明非自許，今以法違，何自語過？若以言「簡」亦成過者，即《因明論》天主敘彼有法自相相違之量，應非真破，亦有自語相違過故。彼既不違，此何即過？故然改宗云：汝同異性非無此理。若牒論全文而為有法，故當依《疏》。

I examine this and say: If one does not say that "qualifying the property to contradict the subject can be a contradiction with one's own words," the word "your" in the subject clearly shows it is not accepted by oneself. Now when one contradicts it with the property, what fault of self-contradiction is there? If using words of "qualification" also constitutes a fault, then in the treatise on logical reasons (Nyāyapraveśa), the inference presented by Master Śaṅkarasvāmin that contradicts the intrinsic nature of the subject (dharmi-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana) would not be a genuine refutation, because it too would have the fault of contradicting one's own words. Since that is not a contradiction, why would this immediately be a fault? Therefore, although modifying the thesis to say: "Your nature of similarity-and-difference is not [the nature of substance, etc.]," is not without reason, if one takes up the entire text of the treatise to form the subject, one should still follow the Commentary.