成唯識論演祕 2.277

2.277

詳曰：《疏》立無違，彈者似破，現在名前，未來名履，豈不許意緣未來耶？若許緣者，所緣名履竟有何失？若言，引發是通生義是審決者，難亦誣謬。設縱引發是通生義，何唯審決？豈發動思非通生耶？若言非者，違諸聖教，三業皆能招異熟故。又《疏》但云所引發義名所遊履，而不說為屬能引也；且猶荒野本無路徑，後因人履其路方有，此道豈非人所引耶？發動所引而得道名，於理何失見彈斥乎？

Examination: The Commentary's thesis has no inconsistency. The critic seems to refute it: the present is called the 'path' and the future is called 'what is trodden upon'; do they not admit that the mind cognizes the future? If they admit it cognizes it, what fault is there in calling the cognitive object 'what is trodden upon'? If they say that inducing and initiating means generally producing and belongs to deliberation and determination, this objection is also unfounded and erroneous. Even granting that inducing and initiating means generally producing, why would it pertain solely to deliberation and determination? Does the moving and initiating volition not generally produce? If they say it does not, they contradict the sacred teachings, because all three actions can bring about maturation (vipāka). Furthermore, the Commentary merely says that the meaning of 'what is induced and initiated' is called 'what is trodden upon', and does not say it belongs to that which can induce. It is just as in a wasteland where originally there is no path, but later because people tread upon it a path comes to exist; is this path not induced by people? Being induced by moving and initiating, it acquires the name 'path'—what logical flaw is there that warrants such criticism?