成唯識論演祕 2.284

2.284

詳曰：《疏》已簡云，自無為法舉色等等，他宗無為非此所許，遮過已盡，何有不定？准有義因，乃有相違決定過也。相違因云：許非慮礙及假無為，為、無為中隨一攝故。如實無為，宗義可知。又豈彼宗不許聖者證得無為？若許得者，無為何非現量所得，除現量智更有何法能證無為？若言不同色、心而得名非得者，亦為不可。喻取少分，有現量得即為喻也。

Examination: The Commentary has already qualified this, saying: One's own unconditioned dharmas are covered under the mention of form and so forth; the other school's unconditioned dharmas are not accepted here. The avoidance of fallacies is complete; how could there be inconclusiveness? According to the reason presented by that interpretation, there would instead be the fallacy of a counter-balancing inconclusive reason (viruddhāvyabhicārin). The counter-balancing reason would be: 'Admitting that it lacks cognitive deliberation and material resistance and is nominal unconditioned, because it is subsumed under either conditioned or unconditioned, like real unconditioned dharmas.' The tenet is evident. Furthermore, does that other school not admit that noble ones realize the unconditioned? If they admit that they attain it, why would the unconditioned not be apprehended by direct perception? Apart from directly perceptive wisdom, what other dharma could realize the unconditioned? If they say that because it is not attained in the same manner as form and mind it is called 'not attained', that too is inadmissible. An example takes only a partial similarity; having attainment by direct perception is sufficient to serve as an example.