成唯識論演祕 2.287

2.287

詳曰：若共比量犯他不定即為過者，何有正量？且如九句第二之因，亦犯他宗決定相違，以彼自許有聲性故。域龍何乃斷為正因，及將此因聲、勝相對便為不定，以此故知，共比量者違共及自方名為過，違他便非。不爾，乃違諸教理也。又言無為如色、心等非無體者，為自、他耶？若他無為許之心外，心外不有何言非無？若自宗者，何乃不有他不定耶？若言非許無不定者，與《疏》何別？雖有異端固難為據。

Examination: If committing an inconclusiveness with respect to the other party in a common inference constitutes a fallacy, what could ever be a valid inference? Take, for instance, the second reason of the ninefold wheel of reasons (hetucakra), which also commits a decisive contradiction against the other school, since they themselves accept the presence of 'soundness' (śabdatva). Why then did Dignāga determine it to be a correct reason, and only when contrasting this reason between sound and the Vaiśeṣika did it become inconclusive? From this we know that in a common inference, only when it contradicts both or one's own side is it termed a fallacy; contradicting the other side is not. Were it not so, it would contradict all teachings and logical principles. Furthermore, when they say that the unconditioned, like form and mind, is not devoid of an entity, is this according to one's own school or the other? If it is the other's unconditioned, accepted as external to the mind, since that which is external to the mind does not exist, how can one say it is not nonexistent? If it is one's own school, why would there be an inconclusiveness with respect to the other? If they say that not accepting it eliminates inconclusiveness, how does this differ from the Commentary? Although there are divergent opinions, they are indeed difficult to rely upon.