成唯識論演祕 2.463

2.463

詳曰：觀前諸釋雖總有理，皆未窮難，今助二解：一、我無心定能厭無，無心依心種假立，無色能厭心不已，無色不依色種立。汝無色定能厭在，無色容實不依餘。無心能厭既云無，無心應假依他立，由彼宗說非色非心即為定體，不說依他而假立故，故為斯難。二、以無色定且抑他爾，不息他救，意者思之可知，由此故有第二，假遮非實破也。

Examination: Looking at the preceding explanations, although all have reason, none has exhausted the objection. Now I assist with two interpretations: First, in our mindless attainment, that which is able to revile is absent, and the mindless is nominally established based on the seeds of mind; in the formless [attainment], the mind that can revile does not cease, and the formless is not established based on the seeds of matter. In your formless attainment, that which is able to revile remains, and the formless can be real without depending on anything else. Since in the mindless, that which is able to revile is said to be absent, the mindless should be nominal and established in dependence on other things; because that school states that what is neither matter nor mind is itself the substance of the attainment and does not say it is nominally established in dependence on others, this objection was made. Second, the formless attainment is merely used temporarily to suppress the other, without putting the other's defense to rest. Those who grasp the intent can understand this through reflection. Therefore, there is the second refutation showing that the nominal can obstruct while the real cannot.