成唯識論演祕 2.471

2.471

詳曰：是法差別過，以實有者是法自相，離色、心實有，不離色、心實有是法差別。有宗意成離色、心有，無也定者是不離心，反為異喻，因於彼轉成差別過。

I examine this and say: This is the fallacy of the differentiation of the predicate (dharma-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhana). For substantial existence is the own-character of the predicate: substantial existence apart from form and mind, and substantial existence not apart from form and mind, are differentiations of the predicate. The Sarvāstivāda intention is to establish existence apart from form and mind; the formless absorption is not apart from the mind, so it is conversely a dissimilar instance, and since the reason occurs there, it constitutes the fallacy of [subverting] the differentiation.