成唯識論演祕 2.587

2.587

答：有同、別。且比量心而有同者，通緣彼二。若不爾者，如何得言聞謂比量？比量據此得緣彼二，而言別者，於自、共相為欲了知，心相、行解實比餘法，方名比量所取共相。現量望彼而言同者，但言名、句詮於色、聲常、無常等。此自、共相現量亦緣而言別者，名、句所詮但依心變，無實體性，唯共相轉。現量帶詮，彼之二相總名自相。又現量心尋彼名言所詮之法，雖不定計名屬義等，而作行解亦與彼同，聲不及處智不轉故，佛知彼無以遍緣故，亦與彼同。除前諸義，若五、八識在於因位相，正義有體，定所帶相通有無體，名、句所詮共相無故，故與彼別。

Answer: There are points of sameness and difference. First, as for the inferential mind having points of sameness: it generally takes both of those as its objects. If it were not so, how could it be said that [knowledge gained through] hearing is inference? Inference, based on this, is able to take both of those as its objects. As for having points of difference: intending to comprehend the particular and universal characteristics, only when the mental image and active cognitive understanding truly infer [them by comparison with] other phenomena is it named the universal characteristic apprehended by inference. Comparing direct perception to that, as for having points of sameness: it is merely that names and sentences express form, sound, permanence, impermanence, and so forth. Direct perception also takes these particular and universal characteristics as its objects. As for having points of difference: what is expressed by names and sentences is merely manifested dependent on mind, lacking real substantial nature, and operates solely as universal characteristics. Direct perception carries that which is expressed, and both of those characteristics are collectively termed the particular characteristic. Furthermore, when the mind of direct perception investigates the phenomena expressed by those verbal designations, although it does not definitely conceptualize that names belong to referents and the like, its engaging in active cognitive understanding is also the same as that; because cognition does not operate where sound does not reach, and because the Buddha knows their absence through all-pervading cognition, it is also the same as that. Aside from the preceding meanings, if the five and eighth consciousnesses are in the causal state, in the orthodox doctrine the [cognitive] image has substantial reality, and the image carried in meditative concentration covers both having and lacking substantial reality; since the universal characteristics expressed by names and sentences are non-existent, they are therefore different from that.