成唯識論演祕 3.190

3.190

詳曰：理不一途，寧無此義。委尋疏旨，固亦無違，來難成似。其所以者，言隨本識及對因果以判性者，依種體論，不依用說。善、惡之用，二性自成，何待因果方名善、惡？又種之體隨識因果，性既不恒，何得責令善、惡等種定唯二性？又以種體不離識故名為無記，便難種用不離種體成無記者，亦應色種不離識故而無質礙。色種現果不離種故，應無質礙，體用因果非即、離故。此既不爾，彼云何然？又云：但緣厭種功能，無想定等假不緣者。

Examination: The principles are not confined to a single path; how could this meaning be absent? When the Commentary's intent is thoroughly investigated, it certainly does not conflict either, and the incoming objection turns out to be fallacious. As for the reason why: when it says that nature is determined by conforming to the fundamental consciousness and by confronting cause and fruit, this is explained on the basis of the substance of seeds, not on the basis of their function. The functions of wholesome and unwholesome are established in their two natures by themselves; how would they depend on cause and fruit before being called wholesome or unwholesome? Furthermore, the substance of a seed conforms to the cause and fruit of consciousness, and since its nature is not permanent, how can one demand that wholesome, unwholesome, and other seeds be definitively restricted to only two natures? Furthermore, because the substance of a seed is not apart from consciousness, it is called indeterminate; if one then objects that the function of a seed is not apart from the substance of the seed and must therefore also become indeterminate, then by the same token, because the seeds of form are not apart from consciousness, they should lack material obstruction; and because the actual fruits of the seeds of form are not apart from the seeds, they should lack material obstruction, since substance and function, cause and fruit, are neither identical nor separate. Since this is not the case, how could that be so? Furthermore, it was said: [The eighth consciousness] only takes as an object the function of the seed of revulsion, and does not take as an object designated dharmas such as the absorption of non-conception.