成唯識論演祕 3.944

3.944

無著《攝論》三因破之，此論但一故。彼論第三云：又即與彼和合之識是意識性不應道理，依染污故，時無斷故，意識所緣不可得故。無性釋云：依染污者，由立宗門，顯與彼法自相相違，謂共決定故有三釋：一云依染污者而是宗法，今以為因與彼小乘意識宗法，作法自相相違過也。二云大乘立和合識，非是意為宗法門。小乘所立是意識，性為法自相，依染污因違彼自相。三云依染污等，實是因門。為宗門者，由論主立初和合識，依染污示彼外人。外人即許更不立因，以此所立依染污宗門，與彼外人作是意識，宗法自相相違之過。依正道理初和合識，有法宗上有二種法：一依染污，二非意識。有染污處必有非意宗法性隨，外人雖許初和合識恒依染污，然和合識即是意識，猶如聲上有所作因，無常宗隨即與聲上常宗之法自相相違。

Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha refutes it with three reasons, whereas this Treatise uses only one. Thus, chapter three of that treatise states: 'Furthermore, that the consciousness concordant with that is of the nature of mental consciousness is not reasonable: because it relies on defilement, because it is uninterrupted in time, and because the cognitive object of mental consciousness is ungraspable.' Asabhāva explains: '"Because it relies on defilement" establishes the thesis-component, showing that it contradicts the intrinsic character of that phenomenon, namely because it is mutually determined.' Therefore there are three explanations: The first says that 'relying on defilement' is the property of the subject of the thesis, which is now used as a reason to commit the fallacy of contradicting the intrinsic character of the phenomenon against the Hinayāna thesis-property of mental consciousness. The second says that the Mahāyāna establishes that the concordant consciousness is not mental consciousness as its thesis-statement; what the Hīnayāna establishes is the nature of mental consciousness as the intrinsic character of the phenomenon, and the reason of relying on defilement contradicts that intrinsic character of theirs. The third says that 'relying on defilement' and the like are genuinely the reason-component. The reason it serves as a thesis-component is that the treatise master established that the initial concordant consciousness relies on defilement to point it out to that outsider; the outsider immediately accepted it without further establishing a reason, and using this established thesis-component of 'relying on defilement', it generates the fallacy of contradicting the intrinsic character of the thesis-property that it is mental consciousness against that outsider. According to correct reasoning, on the initial concordant consciousness, the subject of the thesis, there are two properties: first, relying on defilement; second, not being mental consciousness. Wherever there is defilement, the thesis-property of not being mental consciousness necessarily follows. Although the outsider accepts that the initial concordant consciousness always relies on defilement, yet [they claim] the concordant consciousness is precisely mental consciousness; just as on sound there is the reason of being produced, and the thesis of impermanence follows it, which then contradicts the intrinsic character of the phenomenon of the thesis of permanence on sound.