成唯識論演祕 4.151

4.151

答：略為兩釋。一云：依下諸師釋俱有依，除護法外有通恒定、不恒不定名為所依，非據因緣及等無間有不恒等。二云：依下正義具四義者，方名所依，等無間、緣闕、決定等。無時不依名為決定，雖由之生，世既不同，不得名為無時不依。又云恒者俱轉之義，既是過去，恒義便無，其因緣依有不恒定，如現熏種，是種因緣，然後現無而種不絕，故非恒定，亦非所依。疏總相談不恒不定，亦無有失，二義俱得，後釋順疏。有義：斥疏恒不等已，自會五十五及《唯識》云：故但應言依有二種，謂種及現。《瑜伽》且依現行者說，現依有二，俱有、無間；彼論且約俱有依說，但由言略無別所由：此論具明通舉三種。

Answer: Briefly, there are two explanations. The first says: based on the explanations of simultaneous bases by the various masters below, apart from Dharmapāla, there are those who take what can be constant and definite as well as inconstant and indefinite as a basis, not that there is inconstancy in terms of cause-as-condition or equal-and-immediate [condition]. The second says: based on the correct doctrine below, only that which possesses four criteria is called a basis; equal-and-immediate [condition] and cause-as-condition lack definiteness and so forth. That which is never without reliance is called definite; although arising from it, since their time periods differ, it cannot be called never without reliance. Furthermore, 'constant' means operating simultaneously; since it is past, the meaning of constancy is lost; and the cause-as-condition basis is inconstant and indefinite, as when the actual perfumes a seed, it is the cause-as-condition of the seed, but afterwards the actual ceases while the seed does not perish; hence it is not constant and definite, nor is it a basis. For the Commentary to discuss inconstancy and indefiniteness in general terms is also without error; both meanings are admissible, and the latter explanation conforms to the Commentary. One opinion, after censuring the Commentary regarding constancy and inconstancy, reconciles fascicle fifty-five and the Vijñapti-mātra on its own, saying: Therefore one should only say that bases are of two kinds, namely seeds and actual [dharmas]. The Yogācārabhūmi speaks for the moment in terms of actual [dharmas], where actual bases are of two kinds: simultaneous and immediate; that treatise speaks for the moment of simultaneous bases, and it is merely due to brevity of phrasing, without any other reason; whereas this Treatise explains fully, universally presenting all three kinds.