成唯識論演祕 4.538

4.538

有義彈云：別宗如前宗違比量，因無不定已成似量，外量如前之支無過，因云第六意識攝故；如無學等第六意識。外人豈將真量與似量為不定過耶？若彼外量取因量因云六識攝，亦有不定之失，此即共不定，如何說有決定過耶？此彈意云：相違決定前後兩家之支並具。今者前量六識攝因已犯不定，所立別宗復違比量之文便缺。後家舉彼第六意因之支乃具，闕不闕別，何理得成相違決定？若也，敵者還取前因，即是六中共不定攝，何成第六不定過耶？

An opinion criticises this, saying: The distinct thesis is contradicted by inference as before; the reason lacking indeterminacy has already become a pseudo-argument (ābhāsa). The opponent's inference has no fault in its components as before; the reason states 'because of being subsumed under the sixth mental consciousness, like the sixth mental consciousness of the one beyond training and so forth.' How could an opponent use a valid inference against a pseudo-inference to establish the fault of indeterminacy? If that opponent's inference takes the reason of the original argument, saying 'subsumed under the six consciousnesses', it would also commit the fault of indeterminacy, which is a common indeterminate (sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika); how could it be said to have the fault of decisive contradiction (viruddhāvyabhicārin)? The intent of this critique is: In a decisive contradiction, the components of both the prior and latter parties must be complete. Now, the reason 'subsumed under the six consciousnesses' in the prior inference already commits the fault of indeterminacy, and its distinct thesis posited also lacks text contradicting inference. The latter party puts forward the component with the reason of the sixth mental consciousness, which is complete; one being defective and the other complete, on what principle could this constitute a decisive contradiction? If the opponent had taken the prior reason, it would be subsumed under the common indeterminate among the six [types of indeterminacy]; how would it become the fault of the sixth indeterminate?