成唯識論演祕 5.578

5.578

詳曰：《疏》此問、答意簡有宗。有宗：心生無不杖質，縱緣空花、龜毛、兔角，亦以名等為質生起，縱而以簡，由彼名等，是能緣心近遠所託，似於真實故。云即無無本質者，非許名等同實塵等，本質之體云無無者，何得乃以實質為難？又，能詮、所詮，全不相似等者，此亦不然，豈諸質、相皆相似耶？如礙、不礙、慮、不慮等而非一故。餘難准斯，德失可悉，無俟言矣。

Examination says: The intention of this question and answer in the Commentary is to set aside the Sarvāstivāda school. In the Sarvāstivāda school, when mind arises there is none that does not lean upon a mūla-dharmin; even when taking sky-flowers, turtle-hair, or rabbit-horns as objects, it also arises taking names and so forth as its mūla-dharmin. Setting it aside conditionally: because those names and so forth are what the cognizing mind directly or indirectly relies upon, resembling reality, it says that there is none without a mūla-dharmin; it does not grant that names and so forth are identical to real dust and so forth. Since the substance of the mūla-dharmin is said to be 'not non-existent,' how can one make a difficulty by demanding a real mūla-dharmin? Furthermore, regarding 'the signifier and the signified are completely dissimilar' and so forth: this is also not correct; are all mūla-dharmins and images similar to each other? For obstruction and non-obstruction, reflection and non-reflection, and so forth are not identical. Other objections can be understood according to this; their merits and defects are clear, requiring no further words.