成唯識論演祕 6.399

6.399

詳曰：披論觀《疏》，《疏》實無違。有義，初解乃非順教，論云能熏彼相、見種，能熏自種何得稱彼？又帶己相是所緣緣，八緣於種望七現行能熏見、相，云何帶己？帶謂挾帶，帶似之義，由此親緣似彼疎境，疎境方名疎所緣緣；不爾，因何得所緣稱？豈以體類解所緣耶？又言前七識熏八見、相，豈能熏識皆引業耶？何得以彼引因？因果不同為難。設避引因、與果同世，今有此生作業受過，餘非業等既無斯失，何意不取？又既疎緣隔生，何失？論但言前不簡遠近，若不許者，五緣前相亦應不成，亦異世故，故知此師有力隔世成緣義，近遠雖殊俱隔故。又觀《疏》意通於種、現，不障能熏見、相種子為八所緣，但以論有熏彼之言故，約熏於八相、見說，今既局斷，故為難據。

We comment: Examining the Treatise and inspecting the Commentary, the Commentary in truth has no contradiction. The first explanation of the other opinion does not accord with the teaching. The Treatise says 'perfuming the seeds of their nimitta and darśana'; if one perfumes one's own seeds, how can they be termed 'their'? Furthermore, bearing one's own aspect is the definition of an object-condition; when the eighth takes the seeds as its object, with respect to the perfuming darśana and nimitta of the active states of the seventh, how could it 'bear its own'? 'Bearing' means carrying along, the meaning of resembling. Thereby, the immediate cognitive object resembles that distant object, and only then is the distant object called a distant object-condition; if it were not so, on what basis would it obtain the name of an object-condition? Could one explain an object-condition through identity of essence and category? Furthermore, it says that the previous seven consciousnesses perfume the darśana and nimitta of the eighth; do all perfuming consciousnesses induce karmic results? Why raise an objection based on that inducing cause because cause and effect are not in the same lifetime? Even granting the avoidance of the inducing cause being in the same lifetime as the fruit, here one creates karma in this life and receives retribution later, whereas other, non-karmic phenomena do not have this fault; for what reason would one not accept it? Furthermore, since it is a distant condition, what fault is there in its spanning intervening lives? The Treatise merely says 'previous' without distinguishing between near and far. If this were not accepted, then the five taking previous nimittas as cognitive objects would also not be established, as they would likewise belong to different times. Thus we know this master's position that there is efficacy across lifetimes fulfilling the definition of a condition, for although near and far differ, both involve an interval. Moreover, observing the intention of the Commentary, it extends to both seeds and active states; it does not preclude the seeds of the perfuming darśana and nimitta being the cognitive objects of the eighth, but simply because the Treatise contains the words 'perfuming their', it speaks in terms of perfuming the nimitta and darśana of the eighth. Now, because he restricts his judgment, it is taken as ground for objection.