成唯識論演祕 7.367

7.367

詳曰：作量、直責理俱難詳。所以然者：前師但云無分別智無有相分、不言餘無，何得而以色、非色智為量、直責？今以理准，文闕一重，難之與答。難云：除無分別智，餘一切心正緣境時應無相分，名緣境故，如汝無分別智緣境之時。前師答云：設爾何失？故《論》牒云：「若無彼相名緣彼」等，難色等智，展轉成立。真見有相，《論》不言者，以巧略文，令生後智。難色等智，今為量云：汝緣色之智能緣聲等；許無聲等相故；如緣聲等智。餘量准知。有義斷云「無因喻」者，真、似可知。

Detailed analysis: Setting up a syllogism and issuing a direct challenge are both difficult to justify in principle. Why is that? The previous master only stated that non-conceptual wisdom has no nimitta-bhāga, not that the remaining [types of mind] lack it; how could one use wisdom regarding form and non-form as a syllogism or direct challenge? If inferred by principle now, the text lacks one layer of challenge and reply. The challenge says: All minds other than non-conceptual wisdom, when directly taking an object, should lack a nimitta-bhāga, because they are called taking an object, just like your non-conceptual wisdom when taking an object. The previous master answers: Even if that were so, what would be the fault? Therefore, the Treatise takes this up, saying: 'If without that characteristic it were called taking that as object', etc., challenging the wisdom of sound, etc., and establishing it step by step. That genuine vision possesses characteristics is not stated in the Treatise because the text is skillfully abbreviated to allow later wisdom to arise. Challenging the wisdom of sound, etc., we now formulate a syllogism: Your wisdom taking form as an object could take sound, etc., as an object; because you admit it lacks the characteristic of sound, etc.; like the wisdom taking sound, etc., as an object. The remaining syllogisms can be understood accordingly. The assertion by the other opinion that it 'lacks reason and example' can be recognized as genuine or fallacious.