成唯識論演祕 7.457

7.457

詳曰：若但云地，不對於人，可如所斷。若對於人云菩薩地，菩薩之號豈非目彼假者體耶？若許爾者，與假為地何理不得？又本立地祇約行人階位差別，若不對人，何須立地？又人無別攬法成人，所修之行亦即總分，廢總談別，云與修行為依生因。又與修行為勝依等，正釋與假為地所以。又諸菩薩殊勝五蘊，遠因實法而得生起，何過不許？故四十七云：由能攝持菩薩義故名地。正同此論，於菩薩行能攝故，故與菩薩而為地也。

I examine this and say: If one merely speaks of 'ground' without reference to the person, it could be judged as [that critic] states. But if, with reference to the person, one speaks of the 'bodhisattva ground,' does not the title 'bodhisattva' refer to the substance of that nominal entity? If one allows this, on what principle can it not serve as a ground for a nominal entity? Furthermore, the original establishment of grounds is merely based on the differences in the stages of practitioners; if not with reference to the person, why establish grounds at all? Moreover, a person has no distinct [reality], but encompasses dharmas to form a person; the practice cultivated is also simply a part of the aggregate, and setting aside the aggregate to speak of the distinct, it is said to serve as the cause of support and arising for the practice. Furthermore, 'serving as an excellent support for the practice,' and so forth, precisely explains the reason it serves as a ground for the nominal entity. Moreover, the superior five aggregates of bodhisattvas arise remotely caused by real dharmas; what fault is there in accepting this? Therefore, fascicle forty-seven states: Because it can sustain the meaning of bodhisattva, it is called a 'ground.' This precisely agrees with this Treatise: because it can encompass the bodhisattva's practice, it therefore serves as a ground for the bodhisattva.