成唯識論演祕 7.539

7.539

汎爾決擇問答諸法，而有寬、狹差別不同。由斯《對法》第十五中，明其一行、順前、順後，二、三、四等諸句數也。故彼論云：一行者，即問論法，謂以一法與餘法一一互相問已，除此法更以第二法與餘法互相問，如是一一問一切法。今有問言：若成就眼處亦色處耶？設成就色處亦眼處耶？應順前句答，餘句相望問答順前、後及以四句，如理應思。如是次第，一一漸咸，如理應說。順前句者，謂於諸法中隨取二法更互相問，依止前法以答所問。如有問言：若智亦所知耶？設所知亦智耶？此應作順前句答。諸智亦所知，有所知非智，謂餘法。順後句者，謂即二法展轉相問，依止後法以答所問。如有問言：若所取亦能取耶？設能取亦所取耶？此應作順後句答。諸能取亦所取，有所取非能取，謂色等五境及法處除相應。二句者，謂於所問應二句答，不得有餘。如有依蘊建立依界建立，而發問言：若蘊數亦界數耶？設界數亦蘊數耶？此應作二句答。或蘊數非界數，謂色蘊、識蘊，何以故？無有一界全攝色蘊相；或全攝識蘊相故；或界數非蘊數，謂法界。三句者，謂於所問唯三句答。如有問言：若蘊數亦處數耶？設處數亦蘊數耶？此應三句答。或蘊數非處數，謂色蘊；或處數非蘊數，謂法處；或蘊數亦處數，謂識蘊意處。俱非者，於蘊、處中決定不有。四句者，謂於所問作四句答。如有問言：若成就眼根亦耳根耶？設成就耳根亦眼根耶？應四句答：初句謂聾者，眼根已生不捨；第二句謂盲者，耳根已生不捨；第三句謂眼、耳根已生不捨；第四句除上爾所相。述可句者，謂於所問順爾而答，以如是言述可所問。如有問言：諸無常者皆是行耶？設當是行皆無常耶？應述可答所問如是。遮止句者，謂於所問不爾而答，以不爾言遮止所問。如有問言：蘊外諸行幾諦攝耶？應遮止答：蘊外無行。

In general, questions and answers that determine phenomena differ in being broader or narrower. On this basis, in Fascicle 15 of the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya, it explains the series of propositions: the single sequence, answering according to the prior, answering according to the posterior, two propositions, three propositions, four propositions, and so on. Hence that treatise says: As for the single sequence, that is the method of debating by questioning: having questioned one phenomenon against all other phenomena one by one, excluding that phenomenon one then questions a second phenomenon against the other phenomena, and questions all phenomena one by one in this manner. Now, suppose someone asks: 'If one possesses the eye locus, does one also possess the visible-form locus? If one possesses the visible-form locus, does one also possess the eye locus?' One should answer according to the prior proposition; one should consider according to principle how the questions and answers between the remaining propositions correspond to answering according to the prior, answering according to the posterior, and four propositions. In this order, reducing them one by one gradually, one should speak according to principle. As for answering according to the prior proposition, taking any two phenomena among all phenomena and mutually questioning them, one answers the question based on the prior phenomenon. For instance, suppose someone asks: 'If it is knowledge, is it also knowable? If it is knowable, is it also knowledge?' This should be answered according to the prior proposition: all knowledge is knowable, but some knowables are not knowledge—namely, all other phenomena. As for answering according to the posterior proposition, mutually questioning those two phenomena, one answers the question based on the posterior phenomenon. For instance, suppose someone asks: 'If it is grasped, is it also grasping? If it is grasping, is it also grasped?' This should be answered according to the posterior proposition: all grasping is also grasped, but some grasped things are not grasping—namely, the five objects such as visible forms, and the phenomenon locus excluding associated [states]. As for the two propositions, it means answering the question with two propositions, without any remaining [alternatives]. For instance, based on the establishment of the aggregates and the establishment of the realms, someone raises the question: 'If it is counted as an aggregate, is it also counted as a realm? If it is counted as a realm, is it also counted as an aggregate?' This should be answered with two propositions: either it is counted as an aggregate and not counted as a realm—namely, the form aggregate and consciousness aggregate (why? because there is no single realm that completely subsumes the characteristics of the form aggregate, or completely subsumes the characteristics of the consciousness aggregate); or it is counted as a realm and not counted as an aggregate—namely, the phenomenon realm. As for the three propositions, it means answering the question with only three propositions. For instance, suppose someone asks: 'If it is counted as an aggregate, is it also counted as an entrance? If it is counted as an entrance, is it also counted as an aggregate?' This should be answered with three propositions: either it is counted as an aggregate and not counted as an entrance—namely, the form aggregate; or it is counted as an entrance and not counted as an aggregate—namely, the phenomenon entrance; or it is counted as an aggregate and also counted as an entrance—namely, the consciousness aggregate and the mind entrance. 'Neither' definitively does not exist among the aggregates and entrances. As for the four propositions, it means answering the question with four propositions. For instance, suppose someone asks: 'If one possesses the eye faculty, does one also possess the ear faculty? If one possesses the ear faculty, does one also possess the eye faculty?' One should answer with four propositions: the first proposition refers to a deaf person who has generated the eye faculty and not relinquished it; the second proposition refers to a blind person who has generated the ear faculty and not relinquished it; the third proposition refers to having generated both eye and ear faculties and not relinquished them; the fourth proposition excludes all the aforementioned characteristics. As for the affirming proposition, one answers the question by concurring, affirming the question with the words 'It is so.' For instance, suppose someone asks: 'Are all impermanent things conditioned formations? If they are conditioned formations, are they all impermanent?' One should answer by affirming: 'The question is indeed so.' As for the denying proposition, one answers the question by not concurring, denying the question with the words 'It is not so.' For instance, suppose someone asks: 'How many truths subsume conditioned formations outside the aggregates?' One should answer by denying: 'Outside the aggregates there are no conditioned formations.'