唯識二十論述記 1.81

1.81

答：《成唯識論》第十卷中，略有三說：第一師說：「然相分等，依識變現，非如識性依他中實。不爾，唯識理應不成，許識內境俱實有故。」第二師說：「或識相見等從緣生，俱依他起，虛實如識，唯言遣外，不遮內境。不爾，真如亦應非實。境既同識，何名唯識？應名唯境，虛實同故，識唯內有，境通外故，恐濫於彼，但言唯識。或諸愚夫迷執於境，起煩惱業，生死沈淪，哀愍於彼，但說唯識。令自觀心解脫生死，非說內境如外都無。」雖有內境，亦不如心，此中但說如心實者。第三師說：「或相分等，皆識為性，由熏習力，似多分生。真如亦是識之實性，故除識性無別有法。」此第三師安慧等。前二師義護法等宗，然有別說。合而論者，第二師說勝，無過失故，識者自知。然《佛地論》但有一說，同第一師。

Answer: In the tenth fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun, there are briefly three explanations. The first master says: "However, the object-aspect and so on are manifested through transformation based on consciousness, and are not real within the paratantra like the nature of consciousness. Otherwise, the principle of vijñapti-mātra would fail, since it would admit that consciousness and internal objects are both real." The second master says: "Or the object, seeing, and so on of consciousness arise from conditions, both being paratantra; their unreality and reality are like consciousness. The word 'only' negates the external, but does not exclude internal objects. Otherwise, tathatā would also have to be non-real. If objects are identical to consciousness, why is it called vijñapti-mātra? It should be called 'object-only', since their unreality and reality are identical. Consciousness exists only internally, whereas objects extend to the external; fearing confusion with the latter, it is merely called vijñapti-mātra. Or, because foolish beings are confused and grasp objects, giving rise to afflictions and karma, and sinking in saṃsāra, out of pity for them it is merely called vijñapti-mātra. This causes them to contemplate their own minds and be liberated from saṃsāra, but does not mean that internal objects are completely non-existent like external ones." Although there are internal objects, they are also not like the mind; here, it only speaks of those that are real like the mind. The third master says: "Or the object-aspect and so on all have consciousness as their nature; due to the power of perfuming, they arise resembling multiple divisions. Tathatā is also the real nature of consciousness; therefore, aside from the nature of consciousness, there is no separate dharma." This third master is Sthiramati and others. The views of the first two masters are the tenets of Dharmapāla and others, though they have distinct formulations. Assessing them together, the explanation of the second master is superior, as it is without flaw; those who know will discern this themselves. However, the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra has only one explanation, which agrees with the first master.