唯識二十論述記 2.192

2.192

述曰：此顯二因成能見識現在非有，彼此共許，要第六識具三分別，方能起此分別現覺；五識不具三種分別，故不能起此等現覺。此等現覺既在意識，起此覺時，故彼能見眼等五識，必入過去，落謝非有。先見是物，後方起覺，故正見及覺二，時必不俱。能見實現覺，此時既無，寧許此覺有是現量，證外境有？若正現量證色等時，緣心內法，無假智詮，故證不成。以正量部心、心所法，燈焰、鈴聲唯滅相滅，念念生滅；色等法滅，亦待外緣。即隨此事長短一期，後方有滅。起證如是現量覺時，眼識不住，故入過去，其境色等，一期未滅，故此唯破起此覺時，能見已無，不破所見此時非有。設縱有故，應立量言：起此覺時必非現量；是散心位能見已無故；如散心位緣於過去百千劫事。破境一期，如餘論說。

The commentary says: This shows two reasons establishing that the consciousness capable of seeing does not exist in the present. Both sides mutually agree that it must be the sixth consciousness, possessing the three kinds of discrimination, that can give rise to this discriminative direct awareness; the five consciousnesses do not possess the three kinds of discrimination, and so cannot give rise to this kind of direct awareness. Since this direct awareness resides in the mental consciousness, when this awareness arises, those five consciousnesses such as the eye consciousness that can see must have entered the past, having fallen away into non-existence. One first sees the object, and only afterwards gives rise to the awareness; therefore, the precise seeing and the awareness definitely cannot be simultaneous. Since the genuine direct awareness that can see does not exist at this time, how can this awareness be admitted to be direct perception proving the existence of external objects? When genuine direct perception experiences form and so forth, it takes an internal mental phenomenon as its object and is free from nominal cognition and verbal designations; hence the proof is unestablished. According to the Saṃmatīya, mind and caittas, lamp flames, and bell sounds perish solely by the mark of cessation, arising and ceasing from moment to moment; the cessation of material forms and so forth also awaits external conditions. They endure for a certain period of time, whether long or short, and only then perish. When the awareness directly experiencing such perception arises, the eye consciousness does not remain, and thus has passed into the past; its object, form and so forth, has not yet perished during that period. Therefore, this refutation merely shows that when this awareness arises, the seeing is already gone, without refuting that the seen object is non-existent at this time. Even granting that it exists, an inference should be formulated: 'When this awareness arises, it definitely cannot be direct perception; because it occurs in a distracted state of mind wherein the seeing is already gone; like a distracted state of mind taking as its object events of hundreds of thousands of eons in the past.' The refutation of an object's single period of duration is as explained in other treatises.