唯識二十論述記 2.239

2.239

述曰：釋頌初句，無始已來串習虛妄，未植善種，真智不生，如何得知生死夢境不實顯現，如夢境無，此答前難。應立量言：生死之識不能稱理知自境無；許夢識攝故；如極成夢識。然亦許有少能自知，如今聞教，知境非有，如極成夢。亦少自知，不名真覺，恐違世間及法差別隨一過故。宗云「稱理」，因有「許」言。世間眠夢，彼此共許，名為「極成」。簡生死夢，他不許故。外人伏難：既生死識不能稱理如實自知，何名真覺而實得知今境非有？

Commentary: This explains the first line of the verse. From beginningless time habituated in falsity, with good roots not yet planted, true cognition does not arise; how could one know that the dream objects of saṃsāra unrealistically manifest, being non-existent like dream objects? This answers the previous objection. One should formulate an inference: The consciousness of saṃsāra cannot correspond to principle in knowing its own objects to be non-existent; because it is conceded to be subsumed under dream consciousness; like widely accepted dream consciousness. Yet it is also conceded that some can know a little by themselves, as when now hearing the teaching and knowing that objects do not exist, like widely accepted dreams. Also knowing a little by oneself is not called true awakening, for fear of contradicting worldly consensus and committing the fallacy of being unestablished in the specific property of the thesis for one party. The thesis states 'correspond to principle', and the reason has the word 'conceded'. Worldly sleeping and dreaming are mutually conceded by both parties, and are called 'widely accepted'. It excludes the dream of saṃsāra because the opponent does not concede it. The opponent raises an implicit objection: Since the consciousness of saṃsāra cannot correspond to principle and know by itself as it really is, what is called true awakening that truly knows present objects do not exist?