唯識二十論述記 2.335

2.335

述曰：此即第二，難彼許緣。若凡及聖諸他心智，親能緣知他心等者，所說唯識理應不成，許此智緣心外境故。復立量言：汝他心智應非唯識；許此智緣心外境故；如我此智。喻中不言如我此智，便闕同喻。然他心智亦能了知他心所法，唯名他心者，從主勝說故。然此不能了知他心能緣心等，亦不了知彼所緣境，若許知者，便有自心知自心過。自心有緣彼，彼有緣自心。故若許知，便有此失。若別時緣，即無此過。自心前後，許相緣故。既爾，大乘許一剎那自心，返緣彼能緣，彼能緣等，何不許緣。此亦不爾，但許一念自心自緣，謂自證心緣見分等，猶尚不許一念見分，返緣自證。豈許見分一念自緣，唯見分能緣他心故？若爾，他心緣自身自證，亦應得說一念他心智得緣彼境。此亦不爾，前已說故。謂前已說一念見分不許能緣自自證分，證自證分，類此亦爾，故他心智，但知他身心、心所法，不緣彼境。及彼能緣自自證分，不名他心智故，此說因位，非佛等心。

The Commentary states: This is the second, objecting to the admittance that it takes them as object. If the various knowledges of others' minds—whether of ordinary persons or of nobles—can directly take as object and know others' minds and the like, then the vijñapti-mātra you teach should reasonably fail to be established, because you admit that this knowledge takes objects external to the mind as its object. He again establishes an anumāna, saying: 'Your knowledge of others' minds should not be vijñapti-mātra; because you admit that this knowledge takes objects external to the mind as its object; like this knowledge of mine.' If one does not say 'like this knowledge of mine' in the example, there would be a lack of a sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta. However, the knowledge of others' minds can also know the caittas of others; it is only named 'others' minds' because it is designated according to the primary and superior. Yet this cannot know the apprehending mind and so forth of the other's mind, nor does it know its apprehended object; if one admitted that it knew them, there would be the fault of one's own mind knowing one's own mind. One's own mind takes that as object, and that takes one's own mind as object; therefore, if one admitted such knowledge, this fault would occur. If it takes them as object at different times, then there is no such fault, because one admits that the earlier and later of one's own mind take each other as object. If so, since the Mahāyāna admits that in a single moment one's own mind turns back to take its apprehending aspect as object, why not admit that it takes the other's apprehending aspect and so forth as object? This too is not so: we only admit that in a single thought-moment one's own mind takes itself as object, meaning that the self-authenticating consciousness takes the seeing division and so forth as object, yet we still do not admit that the seeing division in a single thought-moment turns back to take the self-authenticating [division] as object. How could we admit that the seeing division takes itself as object in a single thought-moment, since it is only the seeing division that can take another's mind as object? If so, when another's mind takes its own self-authenticating aspect as object, one should also be able to say that the knowledge of another's mind in a single thought-moment can take that object as its object. This too is not so, because it was already explained earlier: namely, it was already explained earlier that a seeing division in a single thought-moment is not admitted to be capable of taking its own self-authenticating division as object; the authentication of the self-authenticating division is also of this type. Therefore, the knowledge of others' minds only knows the minds and caittas of other persons; it does not take their objects as object, nor its own apprehending self-authenticating division, for [otherwise] it would not be called knowledge of others' minds. This is stated of the causal stage, not of the mind of a Buddha and so forth.