唯識二十論述記 2.353

2.353

述曰：此第二釋不如實義，由自身中法執能取、所取分別種子猶未斷故，此二於境不如實知，此則總說。若別說者，此他心智通有、無漏。若有漏者，略有二說：安慧等云：諸有漏心唯有自體，無相、見分，如此卷初。《唯識》中說：所說見、相，皆是所執，謂此識體轉似他心相貌生起。他本質心實不緣著，亦自心內不變相分似於他心，由善等心有法執故，自證分上似他相生，此似彼相，遍計所執體性非有。其自體分依他起攝，即說此為他心智也。然護法等此唯識釋亦無異解，如《成唯識》護法等云：謂諸有漏心依他性中亦有三分，遂作難言：「外色實無，可非內識境；他心實有，寧非自所緣？誰說他心非自識境，但不說彼是親所緣。謂識生時無實作用，非如手等親執外物，日等舒光親照外境；但如鏡等似外境現，名了他心，非親能了。親所了者，謂自所變，故契經言：『無有小法能取少法』，但識生時，似彼相現，名取彼物。」即自心等以他實心為增上緣，所取本質，自心別變，作相分心，似他本物，說此見分為了他心，名他心智。此前二說皆有漏智，若是無漏他心智者，如《成唯識》略有三說：「諸後得智有二分耶？有義：俱無，離二取故」，同有漏心初師所說。然《佛地論》雖無漏心有相、無相略有三說，約後得智，既無此義。此師菩薩及二乘等諸無漏心皆有法執，《佛地論》中，亦有此義。似二取現，說有見、相，見、相即是遍計所執，體是無法，說能所取是所執故。無處正說依他起故，唯二等者，但自證分，似於二現，說之為二。依他性中實無有二，說為他心智，如有漏心說。

The Commentary says: This is the second explanation of the meaning of 'not as it truly is'. Because the seeds of the conceptual differentiation of grasper and grasped with respect to attachment to phenomena within one's own stream have not yet been severed, both of these [kinds of cognition] do not know the object as it truly is; this is the general explanation. If we explain it specifically, this knowledge of other minds extends to both the defiled and the undefiled. If it is defiled, there are briefly two explanations. Sthiramati and others say: all defiled minds possess only the self-substance, without the objective and subjective aspects, just as discussed at the beginning of this fascicle. In the [treatise on] Vijñapti-mātra it is stated that what are spoken of as subjective and objective aspects are all imagined; that is, the entity of this consciousness arises transforming into the semblance of the features of another mind. It does not truly cognize the original mind of the other person, nor does its own mind internally transform an objective aspect that resembles the other mind; because wholesome and other minds possess attachment to phenomena, an appearance resembling the other arises upon the self-witnessing aspect, and this appearance resembling that one is an imagined nature that lacks intrinsic substantiality. Its self-substance aspect is subsumed under the other-dependent nature, and precisely this is called knowledge of another mind. Yet Dharmapāla and others, in their commentary on Vijñapti-mātra, also have no differing understanding; as Dharmapāla and others state in the Cheng weishi lun: In all defiled minds there are also three aspects within the other-dependent nature. Then an objection is raised: 'External form does not truly exist, so it may well not be an object of internal consciousness; but another mind truly exists, so why would it not be an object of one's own [cognition]?' Who says another mind is not an object of one's own consciousness? We only do not say that it is an immediate object. That is, when consciousness arises it has no real activity; it is not like a hand directly grasping an external thing, nor like the sun emitting light directly illuminating an external object. It is merely like a mirror manifesting a semblance of an external object; this is called understanding another mind, not directly understanding it. What is directly understood is what is transformed by oneself. Therefore the sūtra states: 'There is no tiny phenomenon that can grasp any little phenomenon.' But when consciousness arises, it manifests resembling the aspect of that [object], which is called grasping that thing. That is, one's own mind and so forth takes the real mind of the other as the adhipati-pratyaya; the original entity grasped is separately transformed by one's own mind to produce an objective-aspect mind that resembles the other's original object. This subjective aspect is said to understand the other mind, and is termed knowledge of another mind. These previous two explanations both concern defiled knowledge. If it is undefiled knowledge of another mind, as in the Cheng weishi lun, there are briefly three explanations: 'Do all forms of subsequent knowledge have two aspects? One position holds: they lack both, because they are free from the two graspers', which is identical to what was stated by the first master concerning defiled minds. Although the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra states that undefiled minds briefly have three positions regarding possessing or lacking an objective aspect, with respect to subsequent knowledge this [latter] position is absent. According to this master, all undefiled minds of bodhisattvas, the two vehicles, and so on, possess attachment to phenomena; in the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra this position is also found. Manifesting as a semblance of the two graspers, they are said to have subjective and objective aspects; the subjective and objective aspects are precisely the imagined nature, their substance being non-existent, because grasper and grasped are said to be the imagined. Since nowhere is it correctly stated that they are the other-dependent nature, 'only two' and so forth simply means that the self-witnessing aspect manifests resembling the two, and is spoken of as two. In the other-dependent nature there are truly not the two; this is termed knowledge of another mind, just as was stated regarding the defiled mind.