大乘百法明門論疏 2.16

2.16

解云：「為掉舉數，論判是其貪分，若此數離貪外無別體者，貪不與嗔、癡相應。若爾，別有掉不得與一切煩惱相應過失。既言掉與一切煩惱相應，故知掉別有體。掉既言是貪一分、有別體，當知惛沈，散亂亦言唯是癡分，故知亦有別體。而准《對法》文，但隨煩惱中放逸是貪嗔癡一分者，則是實有。此隨煩惱二十中，唯此無慚、無愧、惛沈、掉舉、不信、懈怠、心亂七數，謂是貪嗔癡分；其餘十三數，或言一分，或言依止，故知並是假有。不定四數中，睡眠、惡作亦言是愚癡分，亦有別體。謂睡眠用想欲為性，離想外無別體故。故《顯揚論》言：『夢者欲想所作，此亦多虛。』故知睡眠是欲想性，謂是癡分，雖離癡外有別體，然是欲想性故，當知亦是假立；惡作無文。但西國諸師相傳云：『或是慧，雖言癡分，離癡外有別體。』然是思是慧性，離思慧外，無別體故，故知亦是假立。尋、伺兩數，離思離慧無別性故，亦是假立。西國諸師相傳云：『無癡善根亦有別體。』何以得知？一、《瑜伽》中唯言：『善十一中，三是假有，謂捨、不放逸、不害，餘是實有。』故知無癡亦有別體。又云：『大悲用無癡善根為性，與二十二根慧根不言相攝。』故知無癡別有體性。」

The explanation says: “As for the item auddhatya, the treatise judges it to be a portion of rāga. If this item had no separate substance apart from rāga, rāga would not be associated with pratigha and moha. If so, there would be the fault that distinct auddhatya could not be associated with all kleśas. Since it is said that auddhatya is associated with all kleśas, we know that auddhatya has a separate substance. Since auddhatya is said to be a portion of rāga and yet has a separate substance, one should know that though styāna and vikṣepa are also said to be portions solely of moha, we know that they also have separate substances. And according to the text of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, whenever in the upakleśas pramāda is a portion of rāga, pratigha, and moha, it is substantially existent. Among these twenty upakleśas, only these seven items—āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, styāna, auddhatya, āśraddhya, kausīdya, and mental distraction—are called portions of rāga, pratigha, and moha; the remaining thirteen items are spoken of either as ‘a portion’ or as ‘relying upon,’ so we know they are all conventionally existent. Among the four aniyata items, middha and kaukṛtya are also called portions of moha, yet they have separate substances. That is, middha has saṃjñā and chanda as its nature, because apart from saṃjñā it has no separate substance. Hence the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: ‘Dreams are produced by desire and ideation; these too are largely unreal.’ Therefore we know that middha is of the nature of chanda and saṃjñā, called a portion of moha; although having a separate substance apart from moha, yet because it is of the nature of chanda and saṃjñā, one should know that it too is nominally established. Regarding kaukṛtya, there is no text. But the masters of the Western lands have traditionally said: ‘It is either prajñā, or though called a portion of moha, it has a separate substance apart from moha.’ Yet it is of the nature of cetanā or prajñā, and apart from cetanā and prajñā it has no separate substance, so we know it too is nominally established. The two items of vitarka and vicāra, having no separate nature apart from cetanā and prajñā, are likewise nominally established. The masters of the Western lands have traditionally said: ‘The wholesome root of amoha also has a separate substance.’ By what is this known? First, in the Yogācārabhūmi it only says: ‘Among the eleven wholesome ones, three are conventionally existent, namely upekṣā, apramāda, and ahiṃsā; the rest are substantially existent.’ Hence we know that amoha also has a separate substance. Furthermore, it says: ‘Great compassion takes the wholesome root of amoha as its nature, and is not said to be subsumed within the prajñendriya among the twenty-two faculties.’ Hence we know that amoha has a distinct substance and nature.”