因明入正理論疏 1.48

1.48

諸量之中，古說或三：現量；比量；及聖教量，亦名正教及至教量，或名聲量，觀可信聲而比義故。或立四量，加譬喻量，如不識野牛，言似家牛，方以喻顯故。或立五量，加義准量，謂若法無我，准知必無常，無常之法必無我故。或立六量，加無體量，入此室中，見主不在，知所往處，如入鹿母堂不見苾芻，知所往處。陳那菩薩廢後四種，隨其所應攝入現、比，故《理門》云：「彼聲喻等，攝在此中。」由斯論主但立二量。

Among the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), the ancients spoke of three: perception (pratyakṣa); inference (anumāna); and scriptural authority (āptāgama-pramāṇa), also called correct scripture or supreme scriptural authority, or called verbal testimony (śabda-pramāṇa), because one infers meaning by examining trustworthy words. Or they established four means of valid cognition, adding comparison (upamāna-pramāṇa), as when, not knowing a wild ox (gavaya), one says it resembles a domestic cow, thereby clarifying it through comparison. Or they established five means of valid cognition, adding presumption (arthāpatti-pramāṇa), meaning that if phenomena are self-less, by presumption one knows they must be impermanent, because impermanent phenomena are necessarily self-less. Or they established six means of valid cognition, adding non-apprehension (anupalabdhi-pramāṇa), as when entering a room and seeing the master is not present, one knows where he has gone; or like entering the hall of Mṛgāra's Mother and not seeing the monks, one knows where they have gone. Bodhisattva Diṅnāga discarded the latter four kinds, subsuming them as appropriate into perception and inference; hence the Nyāyamukha says: 'Those [means of valid cognition such as] verbal testimony and comparison are subsumed within these.' Because of this, the treatise author establishes only two means of valid cognition.