因明入正理論疏 1.56

1.56

問：「何故長行牒前頌文，不依次釋？又與前頌開合不同？」答：「略有三釋。一云：前頌標宗，二悟類別，立破真似，相對次用，所以八義次第如是。長行廣釋，逐便即牒，性相求之，何須次牒？頌以真似各別開成八義，長行以體類有同合成六段，亦不相違。二云：頌中以因明之旨本欲立正破邪，故先能立，次陳能破，《理門論》云：『為欲簡持能立、能破義中真實，作斯論故。』所申無過，立破義成；所述過生，何成立破？故立破後，次陳二似。雖知真、似二悟不同，開示證人，俱悟他攝。刊定法體要須二量，現量則得境親明，比量亦度義無謬，故先現量，比量後陳。刊定則雖成，謬妄還難楷准，故當對二真，次明二似，故頌八義次第如是。長行同於《理門》所說，以因明法先立後破，免脫他論、摧伏他論為勝利故。立義之法，一者真立，正成義故；二者立具，立所依故。真因、喻等名為真立，現、比二量名為立具，故先諸師正稱能立，陳那以後非真能立，但為立具，能立所須，故能破前先明二量。親疎能立皆有真、似，以自相明，故真立後即明似立，二真量後明二似量。此之六門，由是能立及眷屬故，《理門》說上六名真似立故，立義成已，次方破他，故後方明能破、似破。三云：真立似立、真量似量各有別體，真立體即無過多言，似立體即有過多言，真量明決之智，似量闇疑之智，各有別故。若真能立、若能立具皆能立故，先首明之。能破、似破雖體即言，境無有異，能破之境體即似立，似破之境即真能立，須識立境，方可申破，立已方破，故後明之。開合別明，體類同故，長行與頌由此不同。」

Question: "Why does the prose text, in citing the preceding verses, not explain them in their sequence? And why does its combination and division differ from the preceding verse?" Answer: "There are briefly three explanations. The first says: The preceding verse marked the fundamental themes; the categories of enlightenment for the two [persons] are distinct; genuine and pseudo-proof and refutation are paired and deployed in order, and therefore the sequence of the eight meanings is like this. The prose broadly explains them, citing them as convenient; pursuing their nature and characteristics, why must it cite them in sequence? The verse individually divided genuine and pseudo into eight topics, whereas the prose combines them into six sections because they share a common essence and category, which also entails no contradiction. The second says: In the verse, the fundamental aim of hetuvidyā is to establish the correct and refute the deviant; therefore, genuine proof comes first and genuine refutation is presented next. The Nyāyamukha says: 'In order to select and preserve what is true among the meanings of proof and refutation, this treatise was composed.' If what is put forward is without fault, the meaning of proof and refutation is accomplished; if faults arise in what is stated, how could proof and refutation be established? Therefore, after proof and refutation, the two pseudo-[forms] are presented next. Although we know that the two enlightenments—genuine and pseudo—are distinct, revealing [them] to the judges is in both cases subsumed under enlightening others. To definitively determine the real nature of phenomena, two instruments of knowledge are necessarily required: perception grasps the object intimately and clearly, and inference also assesses the meaning without error; therefore, perception comes first, and inference is presented after. Although the definitive determination is accomplished, erroneous delusions are still hard to standardize; therefore, facing the two genuine ones, one next clarifies the two pseudo-ones. Hence the sequence of the eight meanings in the verse is like this. The prose accords with what is said in the Nyāyamukha: by the method of hetuvidyā, one proves first and refutes later, because freeing oneself from others' arguments and subduing others' arguments constitutes an excellent advantage. As for the method of establishing a thesis: first is genuine proof, because it correctly accomplishes the thesis; second is the instrument of proof, because it is that on which proof relies. The genuine reason, example, and so on are called genuine proof; the two instruments of knowledge, perception and inference, are called the instruments of proof. Therefore, previous masters properly called [them both] 'proof'; after Diṅnāga, they are not genuine proofs, but only instruments of proof, what is needed for proof; hence before refutation, one first clarifies the two instruments of knowledge. Both immediate and mediate proof have genuine and pseudo; since they are clarified by their own characteristics, immediately after genuine proof one clarifies pseudo-proof, and after the two genuine instruments of knowledge one clarifies the two pseudo-instruments of knowledge. Because these six doors are proof and its retinue—and because the Nyāyamukha says the above six are called genuine and pseudo-proof—after the thesis is established, one then refutes others; therefore, at the end one clarifies genuine refutation and pseudo-refutation. The third says: genuine proof and pseudo-proof, genuine instruments of knowledge and pseudo-instruments of knowledge each have distinct essences. The essence of genuine proof is multiple statements without fault; the essence of pseudo-proof is multiple statements with faults. A genuine instrument of knowledge is clear and decisive cognition; a pseudo-instrument of knowledge is dark and doubtful cognition—each is distinct. Since both genuine proof and the instruments of proof are proof, they are clarified first at the beginning. Although genuine refutation and pseudo-refutation have statements as their essence, their objects do not differ: the object of genuine refutation is itself pseudo-proof, and the object of pseudo-refutation is itself genuine proof. One must recognize the object of proof before one can set forth a refutation; refutation occurs only after proof is made, and therefore they are clarified at the end. Since the division, combination, and distinct clarification share the same essence and category, the prose and the verse differ for these reasons."