因明入正理論疏 1.68

1.68

述曰：自下第二示相廣陳，於中有三：一示宗相、二示因相、三示喻相。《瑜伽論》云：「問：『若一切法自相成就，各自安立已法性中，復何因緣建立二種所成立義耶？』答：『為欲令他生信解故，非為生成諸法性相。』問：『為欲成就所成立義，何故先立宗耶？』答：『為先顯示自所愛樂宗義故。』問：『何故次辯因耶？』答：『為欲開顯依現見事決定現理，令他攝受所立宗義故。』問：『何故次引喻耶？』答：『為欲顯示能成道理之所依止現見事故。』問：『何故復說同類、異類，現量、比量、正教量等耶？』答：『為欲開示因喻二種相違、不相違智故。相違謂異類，不相違謂同類，則於因喻皆有現、比量等相違不相違，隨其所應，真似所攝。』彼又重言：『又相違者，由二因緣：一不決定故、二同所成故。』初是六不定，因於同、異二喻或成或違故。後是四不成及四相違，因於宗過，名為不成。於二喻中，一向相返名曰相違，本立共因擬成宗果。因既帶似，理須更成。若更成之，與宗莫別，名同所成，似宗二喻亦在此攝。『不相違者亦二因緣：一決定故、二異所成故。』初是真因、真喻定成宗故。後則是此真因、真喻無諸過失，體能成故，異於所成。『其相違者，於為成就所立宗義不能為量，故不名量。』謂似因、喻，及似現、比量名相違，不成宗故，不名真量。『不相違者，於為成就所立宗義，能為正量，故名為量。』謂真因、喻，及真現、比，正成宗故，正名為量。今此雖不同彼次第，宗之所依及宗因喻、現比量等次第生起，亦准彼釋。」

The commentary states: From here below, the second part presents the characteristics in extensive detail. Within this, there are three parts: first, presenting the characteristics of the thesis; second, presenting the characteristics of the reason; third, presenting the characteristics of the example. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states: "Question: 'If the particular characteristics of all phenomena are already established and each is established within its own intrinsic nature, for what reason are the two kinds of probandum (sādhya) established?' Answer: 'It is in order to cause others to produce faith and understanding, not to generate the intrinsic characteristics of phenomena.' Question: 'In order to establish the probandum, why is the thesis established first?' Answer: 'It is to first display the meaning of the thesis that one cherishes oneself.' Question: 'Why is the reason explained next?' Answer: 'It is to disclose the definitive principle based on empirically observed matters, causing others to accept the established meaning of the thesis.' Question: 'Why is the example adduced next?' Answer: 'It is to display the empirically observed matters that serve as the basis for the establishing principle.' Question: 'Why are similar class, dissimilar class, perception, inference, authoritative testimony, and so forth further expounded?' Answer: 'It is to disclose the cognitions of contradiction and non-contradiction regarding the reason and the example. Contradiction means the dissimilar class; non-contradiction means the similar class. Thus, in both the reason and the example, there are contradiction and non-contradiction with perception, inference, and so on; as appropriate, they are subsumed under valid and pseudo.' That text further reiterates: 'Furthermore, contradiction is due to two causes: first, because of being inconclusive; second, because of being identical with the probandum.' The first refers to the six inconclusive [reasons], because the reason either establishes or contradicts in the similar and dissimilar examples. The second refers to the four unproven and four contradictory [reasons]. When the reason has a fallacy regarding the thesis, it is called unproven. When, in the two examples, it is diametrically opposed, it is called contradictory. Originally, a common reason was established to prove the result of the thesis; since the reason carries a semblance, in principle it must be proved further. If it must be proved further, it is no different from the thesis, hence it is called 'identical with the probandum'; pseudo-theses and the two pseudo-examples are also subsumed herein. 'Non-contradiction is also due to two causes: first, because of being conclusive; second, because of being different from the probandum.' The first refers to the valid reason and valid example definitively establishing the thesis. The second refers to this valid reason and valid example being free from all faults, their essence being capable of proving, and thus being different from the probandum. 'That which is contradictory cannot serve as a pramāṇa for establishing the meaning of the intended thesis, and therefore is not called a pramāṇa.' This means that pseudo-reasons, pseudo-examples, and pseudo-perception and pseudo-inference are called contradictory; because they do not establish the thesis, they are not called true pramāṇas. 'That which is non-contradictory can serve as a correct pramāṇa for establishing the meaning of the intended thesis, and therefore is called a pramāṇa.' This means that true reasons, true examples, and true perception and true inference, because they correctly establish the thesis, are properly called pramāṇas. Although the present text does not follow that order, the arising in sequence of the basis of the thesis, the thesis, reason, example, perception, inference, and so forth is also to be explained by analogy with it."