因明入正理論疏 1.72

1.72

一切法中略有二種：一體、二義。且如五蘊，色等是體，此上有漏、無漏等義名之為義。體之與義各有三名。體三名者：一名自性，《瑜伽》等中古師所說自性是也；二名有法，即此所說「有法者」是；三名所別，如下宗過中名「所別不成」是。義三名者：一名差別，《瑜伽論》等古師所說「差別」是也；二名為法，下相違中云「法自相相違因」等是；三名能別，則如此中名「能別」是。《佛地論》云：「彼《因明論》，諸法自相，唯局自體，不通他上，名為自性。如縷貫花，貫通他上諸法差別義，名為差別。」此之三種，不定屬一門，不同大乘，以一切法不可言說一切為自性，可說為共相。如可說中，五蘊等為自，無常等為共。色蘊之中，色處為自，色蘊為共。色處之中，青等為自，色處為共。青等之中，衣、花為自，青等為共。衣、花之中，極微為自，衣、花為共。如是乃至離言為自，極微為共。離言之中，聖智內冥得本真故，名之為自；說為離言，名之為共。共相假有，假智變故；自相可真，現量親緣，聖智證故。除此以外，說為自性皆假自性，非真自性，非離假智及詮言故。今此因明，但局自體名為自性，通他之上名為差別。准相違中，自性、差別復各別有自相差別，謂言所帶名為自相，不通他故；言中不帶，意所許義，名為差別，以通他故。今憑因明，總有三重：一者局通，局體名自性，狹故；通他名差別，寬故。二者先後，先陳名自性，前未有法可分別故；後說名差別，以前有法可分別故。三者言許，言中所帶名自性；意中所許名差別，言中所申之別義故。

Among all phenomena, there are briefly two kinds: first, substance; second, meaning. Take, for example, the five aggregates: matter and so forth are the substance, while the meanings on it such as contaminated and uncontaminated are called meaning. Substance and meaning each have three names. The three names of substance are: first, intrinsic nature (svabhāva)—this is the intrinsic nature spoken of by the ancient masters in the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts; second, subject (dharmin)—this is the "possessor of attributes" spoken of here; third, that which is qualified (viśeṣya)—this is what is called "the unproven qualified" among the fallacies of the thesis below. The three names of meaning are: first, specific property (viśeṣa)—this is the "specific property" spoken of by ancient masters in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other texts; second, attribute (dharma)—this is what is spoken of below under contradictory reasons as "a reason contradictory to the intrinsic nature of the attribute" and so forth; third, predicate (viśeṣaṇa)—this is what is called the "qualifier" here. The Buddhigi-śāstra says: "In that Hetuvidyā-śāstra, the intrinsic characteristic of phenomena is restricted solely to its own entity and does not extend to others; this is called intrinsic nature (svabhāva). Like a thread stringing flowers, that which strings through and extends over other phenomena as their specific property is called specific property (viśeṣa)." These three kinds do not definitively belong to only one approach. It is not like the Mahāyāna, where all phenomena being ineffable is the intrinsic nature of all, and what can be expressed is the common characteristic. As among the expressible, the five aggregates and so forth are the intrinsic, and impermanence and so forth are the common. Within the aggregate of matter, the sense-datum of matter is the intrinsic, and the aggregate of matter is the common. Within the sense-datum of matter, blue and so forth are the intrinsic, and the sense-datum of matter is the common. Within blue and so forth, cloth and flowers are the intrinsic, and blue and so forth are the common. Within cloth and flowers, subtle atoms are the intrinsic, and cloth and flowers are the common. In this manner, it extends up to the ineffable being the intrinsic, and subtle atoms being the common. Within the ineffable, because noble wisdom inwardly and mysteriously attains the fundamental reality, it is called the intrinsic; when stated as "ineffable," it is called the common. The common characteristic is conventionally existent, transformed by conceptual cognition; the particular characteristic can be real, directly perceived by perception and witnessed by noble wisdom. Aside from this, whatever is stated as intrinsic nature is entirely a conventional intrinsic nature, not a true intrinsic nature, because it is not apart from conceptual cognition and explanatory words. In this hetuvidyā, however, merely being restricted to its own entity is called intrinsic nature, and extending over others is called specific property. By analogy with the contradictory, intrinsic nature and specific property each further have a particular characteristic and a specific property: that which is conveyed by speech is called the particular characteristic, because it does not extend to others; that which is not conveyed in speech, but is the meaning intended by the mind, is called the specific property, because it extends to others. Now, relying on hetuvidyā, there are altogether three levels: First, restricted versus extensive: restricted to the entity is called intrinsic nature, because it is narrow; extending to others is called specific property, because it is broad. Second, earlier versus later: that which is stated first is called intrinsic nature, because previously there was no attribute to distinguish it; that which is stated later is called specific property, because previously there was an attribute that can be distinguished. Third, spoken versus intended: that which is conveyed in speech is called intrinsic nature; that which is intended in the mind is called specific property, because it is the specific meaning expressed in speech.