因明入正理論疏 1.84

1.84

問：「宗依須兩許，言成簡不成，因喻必共成，言極簡不極。何因因、喻不標極成，獨於宗依致極成簡？」答：「有四義：一、宗依極成宗不極，為簡不極言極成。因、喻依體並須極成，無所簡故不說極。二、因、喻能立皆須極，無不極故不須簡。宗是所立，非共成，為有所簡須言極。因、喻之中自比言許、他比言執，而簡別之，故無不極。三、因、喻成中無不成，無濫簡故不言極。成宗之中有不成，有濫簡故獨言極。四、因不成等攝非極，從寬為名不名極。宗不成中無別攝，故說極成簡不極。因中兩俱、隨一等過，喻中所立、能立不成，此等過中已攝不極。兩俱等寬，從餘為稱，有體無體皆此過故。宗過不爾，言極簡之，兩許有體便非是過，故於宗內獨言極成。然《理門》云：『此中宗法，唯取立論及敵論者決定同許，於同品中有非有等，亦復如是。』故知因、喻必須極成，但此論略，《唯識》亦言極成，六識隨一攝故，如極成餘，故知此略。」

Question: 'The bases of the thesis must be accepted by both, so saying "established" excludes what is unestablished; the reason and example must be established in common, so saying "utmost / universally" excludes what is not universal. For what reason do the reason and example not specify "universally accepted", and only the bases of the thesis receive the qualification of "universally accepted"?' Answer: 'There are four reasons: 1. The bases of the thesis are universally accepted while the thesis itself is not; to exclude what is not accepted, it says "universally accepted". Both the bases and the real entities of the reason and example must be universally accepted; having nothing to exclude, they are not stated to be "universal". 2. The reason and example, being that which proves (sādhana), must all be universal; since none are not universal, there is no need for delimitation. The thesis is what is to be proved (sādhya) and is not commonly established; in order to have something delimited, it must be stated as "universal". In the reason and example, arguments for oneself specify "accepted", and arguments for others specify "asserted", thereby delimiting them, so none are non-universal. 3. Among the valid reason and example, there is no unestablished; having no ambiguity to delimit, they do not state "universal". In establishing the thesis, there is the unestablished; having ambiguity to delimit, it alone states "universal". 4. Fallacies such as the unestablished reason (asiddhi) already subsume the non-universal, receiving their name from the broader category and thus not being named "universal". In the unestablished thesis, there is no separate subsumption; therefore it states "universally accepted" to delimit the non-universal. In the reason, fallacies such as unestablished for both (ubhayāsiddha) and for either (anyatarāsiddha), and in the example, the unestablished sādhya and unestablished sādhana—these fallacies already subsume the non-universal. "For both" and so forth are broader terms named from the rest, because whether there is an entity or no entity, they are all this fallacy. The fallacies of the thesis are not like this: saying "universal" delimits them, so that what both accept as possessing real entity is then not a fallacy; therefore within the thesis it alone says "universally accepted". However, the Nyāyamukha states: "Here, the property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva) takes only what is definitely and mutually accepted by the proponent and opponent; the same applies to its presence or absence in the sapakṣa, etc." Hence we know that the reason and example must also be universally accepted, but this treatise merely abbreviates it. The Vijñaptimātratā treatise also states: "Universally accepted, because it is subsumed under any one of the six consciousnesses, like the remaining universally accepted ones." Hence we know this is an abbreviation.'