因明入正理論疏 2.115

2.115

述曰：別釋為四：初二句宗、次二句因、後一句結。如勝論對聲論立聲無常宗，眼所見因。凡宗法因必兩俱許，依宗有法，而成隨一不共許法。今眼見因，勝、聲二論皆不共許聲有法有，非但不能成宗，自亦不成因義。立、敵俱不許，名為俱不成。此不成因依有有法，合有四句：一有體全分兩俱不成，如論所說。二無體全分兩俱不成，如聲論師對佛弟子立「聲是常，實句攝故。」此實攝因，兩說無體，共說於彼有法無故。三有體一分兩俱不成，如立一切聲皆常宗，勤勇無間所發性因，立、敵皆許此因於彼外聲無故。四無體一分兩俱不成，如聲論師對佛弟子說聲常宗，實句所攝，耳所取因。耳所取因，立、敵皆許於聲上有；實句所攝一分因言，兩俱無故，於聲不轉。此四皆過，不成宗故。論眼見因，不但成聲無常為失，成聲之上無漏等義，一切為過，故宗云等。

The commentary says: The separate explanation has four parts: the first two clauses are the thesis, the next two clauses are the reason, and the final clause is the conclusion. As when a Vaiśeṣika formulates against a Śabdavādin the thesis 'sound is impermanent', using the reason 'visible to the eye'. Generally, the reason as a property of the subject (pakṣadharma) must be accepted by both parties as resting upon the subject of the thesis, thereby establishing a property not mutually accepted by either party. Now, with the reason 'visible to the eye', neither the Vaiśeṣika nor the Śabdavādin mutually accepts that it exists in the subject, sound; not only can it not establish the thesis, but it does not in itself constitute the meaning of a reason. Since both the proponent and the opponent do not accept it, it is called 'unestablished for both'. This unestablished reason based on an existent subject comprises four alternatives in total: First, unestablished for both as real in substance and in its entirety, as stated in the treatise. Second, unestablished for both as unreal in substance and in its entirety, as when a Śabdavādin formulates against a Buddhist disciple: 'Sound is permanent, because of being subsumed under the category of substance (dravya-padārtha).' For this reason 'subsumed under substance', both parties say it lacks substance, mutually stating that it does not exist in that subject. Third, unestablished for both as real in substance and partial, as in formulating the thesis 'all sound is permanent', with the reason 'being produced by effort immediately without interruption (prayatnānantarīyaka)'; both the proponent and opponent accept that this reason does not exist in external sound. Fourth, unestablished for both as unreal in substance and partial, as when a Śabdavādin states to a Buddhist disciple the thesis that sound is permanent, using the reason 'subsumed under the category of substance and apprehended by the ear'. The reason 'apprehended by the ear' is accepted by both proponent and opponent to exist in sound; but the partial reason-statement 'subsumed under the category of substance' does not apply to sound because it is absent for both. All four of these are faults, because they fail to establish the thesis. In the treatise, the reason 'visible to the eye' is not only a fault in establishing sound as impermanent, but is a fault in establishing every meaning such as untainted (anāsrava) on sound; hence the thesis says 'and so forth'.