因明入正理論疏 2.118

2.118

此隨一因於有有法，略有八句：一、有體他隨一，如論所說。二、有體自隨一，如聲顯論對佛弟子立「聲為常，所作性故」。三、無體他隨一，如勝論師對諸聲論立「聲無常，德句所攝故」，聲論不許有德句故。四、無體自隨一，如聲論師對勝論立「聲是常，德句攝故」。五、有體他一分隨一，如大乘師對聲論者立「聲無常，佛五根取故」。大乘佛等諸根互用，於自可成，於他一分四根不取。六、有體自一分隨一，如聲論師對大乘者立「聲為常」，說次前因。七、無體他一分隨一，如勝論師對聲論者立「聲無常，德句所攝，耳根取故」，耳根取因兩皆許轉，德句攝因他一分不成。八、無體自一分隨一，如聲論師對勝論者立「聲為常」，說次前因。此中諸他隨一全句自比量中說自許言，諸自隨一全句他比量中說他許言，一切無過，有簡別故。若諸全句無有簡別，及一分句一切為過，如《攝大乘論》說：「諸大乘經皆是佛說，一切不違補特伽羅無我理故，如《增一》等。」此對他宗有隨一失，他宗不許大乘不違無我理故，說有常我為真理故。設許不違，亦有不定，《六足》等論皆不違故，而為不定。

With respect to [the qualification of being] existent or having an existent subject (dharmin), this asiddha of the anyatara variety briefly comprises eight alternatives: First, existent and anyatara for the other (parānyatara-siddha with real entity), as stated in the treatise. Second, existent and anyatara for oneself (svānyatara-siddha with real entity), such as when a Śabdābhivyaktivādin proves to a Buddhist: "Sound is permanent, because it is produced." Third, non-existent and anyatara for the other (parānyatara-siddha without real entity), such as when a Vaiśeṣika proves to various Grammarians: "Sound is impermanent, because it is subsumed under the category of quality (guṇa-padārtha)," because the Grammarians do not accept the category of quality. Fourth, non-existent and anyatara for oneself, such as when a Grammarian proves to a Vaiśeṣika: "Sound is permanent, because it is subsumed under the category of quality." Fifth, existent and partially anyatara for the other, such as when a Mahāyāna master proves to a Grammarian: "Sound is impermanent, because it is grasped by the Buddha's five sense faculties." In Mahāyāna, the Buddha's sense faculties function interchangeably, which is established for oneself, but for the other, a part [of the reason]—that it is not grasped by the [other] four sense faculties—is unestablished. Sixth, existent and partially anyatara for oneself, such as when a Grammarian proves to a Mahāyānist: "Sound is permanent," stating the preceding reason. Seventh, non-existent and partially anyatara for the other, such as when a Vaiśeṣika proves to a Grammarian: "Sound is impermanent, because it is subsumed under the category of quality and is grasped by the auditory faculty." Both accept the operation of the reason "being grasped by the auditory faculty," but the reason "being subsumed under the category of quality" is unestablished for a part with respect to the other. Eighth, non-existent and partially anyatara for oneself, such as when a Grammarian proves to a Vaiśeṣika: "Sound is permanent," stating the preceding reason. Here, whenever the entire alternative is anyatara for the other, stating the words "accepted by myself" within an autonomous inference (svānumāna), or whenever the entire alternative is anyatara for oneself, stating the words "accepted by the other" within an inference for the other (parānumāna), renders them all faultless, because there is qualification. If any of the entire alternatives lacks qualification, or if they are partial alternatives, they are all faulty. As stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: "All Mahāyāna sūtras are the Buddha's word, because none of them contradicts the principle of the selflessness of persons, just like the Ekottarikāgama and so forth." When addressed to other schools, this commits the fault of anyatara, because other schools do not accept that Mahāyāna does not contradict the principle of selflessness, asserting that an eternal self is the true reality. Even if it were conceded not to contradict it, it would also be inconclusive (anaikāntika), because treatises such as the Ṣaṭpādābhidharma also do not contradict it, and thus it becomes inconclusive.