因明入正理論疏 2.13

2.13

彼復難言：「若唯因言所詮表義說名為因，斯有何失？」此難意說：如所作言所詮表義唯名為因，瓶同空異，名喻非因，斯有何失？復問彼言：「復有何德？」彼古答言：「別說喻分是名為德。」陳那復難：「應如世間所說方便，與其因義都不相應。」此難意云：如世間外道亦說因外別有二喻，汝於因外說喻亦爾。遍宗法性既是正因，所說二喻非是正因，但為方便助成因義。此喻方便既與因別，則與因義都不相應。

He objected again, saying: 'If only the meaning expressed by the statement of the reason is called the reason, what fault is there in this?' The meaning of this objection is: if the meaning expressed by the word 'produced' is solely called the reason, and the pot as similar and space as dissimilar are called examples and not the reason, what fault is there in this? He then asked him: 'What merit is there in that?' The ancient master replied: 'Stating the example as a separate component is precisely what constitutes the merit.' Diṅnāga objected again: 'It would then be like an expedient means taught in the worldly context, entirely discordant with the meaning of its reason.' The meaning of this objection is: just as worldly non-Buddhists also state that there are two examples separate from the reason, your stating the example outside the reason is just the same. Since pervasive presence in the property of the subject is the valid reason, the two examples stated are not the valid reason, but merely expedient means assisting the completion of the reason's meaning. Since this expedient means of the example is distinct from the reason, it is entirely discordant with the meaning of the reason.