因明入正理論疏 2.140

2.140

然諸比量略有三種：一他、二自、三共。他比量中略有三共，自比、共比各三亦然，合有九共。今此舉三，恐文繁故，下皆准知。一他共、二自共、三共共。如以佛法破數論云：汝我無常，許諦攝故，如許大等。此他比量無常之宗，二十三諦為同品，以自性為異品。許諦攝因，於同、異品皆悉遍有，故是他共。若不爾者，宗、因、喻等皆有違於自教等失。數論計我，我是常，許諦攝故，如許自性。此自比量立我常宗，自性為同，大等為異。許諦攝因，二皆遍轉，故是自共。如論所說，即是共共也。

Moreover, inferences (anumāna) are briefly of three kinds: 1. parānumāna; 2. svānumāna; 3. ubhayānumāna. In parānumāna there are roughly three kinds of common; in svānumāna and ubhayānumāna there are each three as well, making nine kinds of common in all. Here three are cited lest the text become cumbersome; the rest should all be understood accordingly: 1. other-common (para-sādhāraṇa); 2. self-common (sva-sādhāraṇa); 3. both-common (ubhaya-sādhāraṇa). For example, using the Buddhist doctrine to refute the Sāṃkhya: 'Your self is impermanent, because it is accepted to be subsumed under the tattvas, just like the accepted mahat and the like.' In this parānumāna thesis of impermanence, the twenty-three tattvas are the sapakṣa, and Primordial Nature (prakṛti) is the vipakṣa. The reason 'accepted to be subsumed under the tattvas' is pervasive in both sapakṣa and vipakṣa, and is therefore other-common. Were it not so, the thesis, reason, and example would all incur the fallacy of contradicting one's own doctrine. The Sāṃkhya asserts the self: 'The self is permanent, because it is accepted to be subsumed under the tattvas, just like the accepted prakṛti.' In this svānumāna thesis establishing that the self is permanent, prakṛti is the similar, and mahat and the like are the dissimilar. The reason 'accepted to be subsumed under the tattvas' pervades both, and is therefore self-common. What is stated in the treatise is both-common.