因明入正理論疏 2.146

2.146

問：「舉因能立，立未成宗，無喻順成，其宗不立。宗既順先不立，此因應非不定。」答：「因闕同喻，宗義無能可成，亦不返成異宗，由此名為不定。非是定能成一宗義故，不與其定名。《理門》難云：『理應四種名不定因，二俱有故，所聞云何？』古因明師不許四外有此不共，故今難云：『以理言之，除決定相違，餘四不定，於同、異品，若遍、不遍皆悉俱有，可成異類法，故可名不定。』今所聞性因，不可屬異類，無更所成，如何不定？比量難云：所聞性因非不定攝宗，異品無故因，如二、八因喻。又所聞因非不定攝宗，同品無故因，如四、六因喻。彼論釋云『由不共故』，謂如山野多有草木，雖無的屬，若有取之，即可屬彼，亦是不定。此因亦爾，同、異二品雖皆不共，無定所屬，望所成立宗法同、異，可有通於成隨一義，故名不定。彼釋此不共義云：『以若不共所成立法，所有差別，遍攝一切，皆是疑因。』謂若不共所聞性因，凡所成立常、無常等法所有一切差別之義，遍攝一切佛法、外道等宗，於彼宗中隨所立宗，此不定因皆是疑因。如佛法立若法處攝、若聲處攝、若有漏攝、若無漏攝，此等諸聲皆無常等為宗。數論立聲若是實有、若是自性等為宗。勝論立聲若德句攝、若非德句攝。離繫親子立二句法，有命、無命，有動增長名為有命，無動不增長名為無命。聲是無命，我是有命等。如是一切所立聲宗，所聞性因，遍於彼宗，皆二品無，並不能令宗性決定，故是疑因。彼重釋言：『唯彼有性，彼所攝故，一向離故。』此意解云：所聞性因唯彼有性，有法之聲彼所攝屬。不唯為同品所攝，亦不異品所攝屬故，是故不定。或所聞性名為有性，彼所聞性唯彼有性聲所攝故，二品皆無，由此名不定。」

Question: "When a reason is cited as a proof to establish an unestablished proposition, if no example conforms to establish it, the proposition is not established. Since the proposition is not established from the start, this reason ought not to be inconclusive." Answer: "Because the reason lacks a homologous example, it has no capacity to establish the meaning of the proposition, nor does it turn around to establish the opposing proposition; therefore it is called inconclusive. Because it does not definitely establish one propositional thesis, it is not given the name 'conclusive'. An objection in the *Nyāyamukha* says: 'In reason, only four kinds should be called inconclusive reasons, because they exist in both [classes]; how can audibility [be so]?' Ancient logicians did not accept that there was this uncommon [reason] outside the four; hence the present objection: 'Speaking by reason, excluding the contradictory-in-conclusion, the other four inconclusive reasons exist in both the homologous and heterologous classes, whether completely or partially; thus they can establish dissimilar phenomena, and therefore can be called inconclusive. Now the reason of audibility cannot belong to a dissimilar class, nor does it have anything else to establish; how can it be inconclusive?' A formal inference objects: The reason of audibility is not included among inconclusive reasons, proposition; because it is absent from the heterologous class, reason; like reasons two and eight, example. Again: The reason of audibility is not included among inconclusive reasons, proposition; because it is absent from the homologous class, reason; like reasons four and six, example. That treatise explains: 'Because it is uncommon'—which means, like many grasses and trees in mountains and fields, although they have no specific owner, if someone takes them, they can belong to that person, and thus it is inconclusive. This reason is also like that: although it is uncommon to both the homologous and heterologous classes, having no determinate affiliation, with respect to being homologous or heterologous to the property of the proposition to be established, it could potentially apply to establish either one; hence it is called inconclusive. That treatise explains this meaning of the uncommon as: 'For whatever is uncommon to the property to be established, all its distinctions comprehensively include everything; all such are reasons of doubt.' This means: as for the uncommon reason of audibility, all the distinct meanings of all phenomena to be established, such as eternal, non-eternal, and so on, comprehensively include all schools, Buddhist and non-Buddhist; whichever proposition is established in those schools, this inconclusive reason is always a reason of doubt. For example, when the Buddhist establishes that whether subsumed under the dharma-base, the sound-base, the contaminated, or the uncontaminated, all these sounds are non-eternal, as propositions; when the Sāṃkhya establishes that sound is either a real entity, or primordial nature, as propositions; when the Vaiśeṣika establishes that sound is either subsumed under the category of quality or not subsumed under quality; when the Nirgrantha-jñātiputra establishes two categories of phenomena, animate and inanimate, where what has motion and growth is called animate, and what lacks motion and does not grow is called inanimate, saying sound is inanimate, the self is animate, and so forth: for all such propositions established about sound, the reason of audibility is absent from both classes across all those schools, and none can render the nature of the proposition determinate; hence it is a reason of doubt. That treatise further explains: 'Only that [subject] has its nature, because it is subsumed under that, and because it is entirely separated.' The meaning of this explanation is: the reason of audibility has its nature only in that [subject]; the sound, which is the property-bearer, possesses and subsumes it. It is not subsumed solely by the homologous class, nor is it subsumed by the heterologous class; therefore it is inconclusive. Or: audibility is called having that nature, and because that audibility is subsumed only under sound that has that nature, it is absent from both classes; on this account it is called inconclusive."