因明入正理論疏 2.148

2.148

此不共因不唯闕初相，非不成攝；不返成異宗，非相違攝。前既唯闕無第三相名共不定，今唯闕無第二相故名不共不定，不順不違，成共宗故。今作決定相違量，解《理門》云：所聞性因，不定因攝宗，同、異相中隨離一故，如共因等。因簡初相，故無前失。《理門》復云：「若對許有聲性是常，此應成因。」此中問意，如聲論師對勝論立「所聞性因，如聲性常」，應成正因。彼自答云：「若於爾時，無有顯示所作性等是無常因，容有此義。然俱可得，一義相違，不容有故，是猶預因。」此意答言：若勝論師於立論時愚鈍無智，不與聲論立所作因成聲無常，彼可正因。若對俱時立無常宗所作因等，一義相違不容有故，是猶預因。此亦有三：如佛弟子對勝論立他比量云：「彼實非實，執德依故。」非實之宗，彼德句等以為同品，雖無異體，許德依因，於同、異品皆非有故，名他不共。若勝論立「我實有，許德依故。」於同、異品二皆非有，名自不共。如論所陳，名共不共。

This uncommon reason does not merely lack the first characteristic, so it is not included among the unestablished; it does not turn around to establish the opposing proposition, so it is not included among the contradictory. Previously, because it lacked only the third characteristic, it was called the common inconclusive; now, because it lacks only the second characteristic, it is called the uncommon inconclusive, neither conforming nor contradicting, establishing a common proposition. Now, formulating a contradictory-in-conclusion inference to explain the *Nyāyamukha*: The reason of audibility is included among inconclusive reasons, proposition; because it is separated from either the homologous or heterologous characteristic, reason; like the common reason, and so on, example. The reason excludes the first characteristic, and thus avoids the previous fault. The *Nyāyamukha* further says: "If [established] against one who accepts that the genus of sound is eternal, this ought to be a valid reason." The meaning of the question here is: if a Śabdika establishes against a Vaiśeṣika, "with the reason of audibility, [sound is eternal] like the eternal genus of sound," it should be a correct reason. It answers itself: "If at that time there is no display of producedness or the like as a reason for non-eternality, this meaning would be possible. However, because both can be found and contradictory for a single meaning is not admissible, it is a reason that produces hesitation." The meaning of this answer is: if the Vaiśeṣika, at the time of debate, is dull and unintelligent, and does not put forward the reason of being produced against the Śabdika to establish that sound is non-eternal, it could be a correct reason. But if they simultaneously establish the non-eternal proposition with the reason of being produced and the like, because contradictory proofs for a single meaning are not admissible, it is a reason that produces hesitation. This also has three types: as when a Buddhist establishes a parānumāna against a Vaiśeṣika, saying: "That substance is not a substance, because you hold it to be the substratum of qualities." For the proposition of non-substance, their quality category and the like are the homologous class; although there is no heterologous entity, because the reason "accepted as a substratum of qualities" is absent from both the homologous and heterologous classes, it is called parānumāna-uncommon. If a Vaiśeṣika establishes: "The self is a real entity, because it is accepted as the substratum of qualities"—it is absent from both the homologous and heterologous classes, so it is called svānumāna-uncommon. What the treatise presents is called ubhayānumāna-uncommon.