因明入正理論疏 2.16

2.16

古返難言：「云何具有所立、能立及異品法二種譬喻而有此失？」彼意難言：云何同品瓶上具有所立無常、能立所作及異品法，此二喻中有不定失？陳那難云：「若於爾時所立異品非一種類，便有此失，如初後三各最後喻。」謂立量時，所立異品亦有非有，非一種類。汝既但指瓶為同品、空為異喻，雖具二喻，喻若非因，便此不定。如初三最後喻者，謂九句中初三第三句同品有、異品有非有。後三最後喻者，謂九句中後三第三句同品有非有、異品亦有非有。此二喻中，若同取有義、異取無義，同喻亦具所立、能立及異法喻，然由異品一分有故，因成不定。以汝同喻如瓶，異喻如空，喻非因故，不別簡言，謂若是常，見非所作，如虛空等，便有不定。若別簡別，喻即是因，便無彼失，簡彼兩三非正因故，要異遍無是正因故。彼復結云：「故定三相唯為顯因，由是道理，雖一切分皆能為因顯了所立，然唯一分且說為因。」此中故定、唯為之聲，彰因三相顯了於宗，二喻即因。雖俱是因，顯了宗義，於三相中遍宗法性，唯此一分且說為因，餘二名喻，據勝偏明，非盡理說，故名為且。前文依此顯了宗義，說因之三相亦不相違。

The ancient [master] retorted in objection: "How could this fault occur when both kinds of examples—possessing the probandum, the probans, and the heterogeneous property—are present?" His objection means: how could there be an inconclusive fault between these two examples when the homogeneous pot possesses the probandum (impermanence) and the probans (being a product), and the heterogeneous property is also present? Diṅnāga objected: "If at that time the heterogeneous instances of the probandum are not of a single kind, then this fault occurs, as in the last examples of the first and last triads." This means that when establishing a thesis, the heterogeneous instances of the probandum may be both existent and nonexistent, not being of a single kind. Since you merely point to a pot as the homogeneous instance and space as the heterogeneous example, even though both examples are present, if the examples were not the reason, then this inconclusiveness would occur. As for "the last examples of the first triad," this refers, among the nine clauses, to the third clause of the first triad: presence in the sapakṣa, and both presence and absence in the vipakṣa. As for "the last examples of the last triad," this refers, among the nine clauses, to the third clause of the last triad: both presence and absence in the sapakṣa, and both presence and absence in the vipakṣa. In these two examples, if the homogeneous takes what is existent and the heterogeneous takes what is nonexistent, the homogeneous example also possesses the probandum and the probans, as well as the heterogeneous example; nevertheless, because it is partially present in the vipakṣa, the reason becomes inconclusive. Because your homogeneous example is "like a pot" and your heterogeneous example is "like space," and because the examples are not the reason, you do not separately specify by saying, "Whatever is permanent is seen to be not a product, like space, etc.," and hence inconclusiveness occurs. If you specify them, then the examples are precisely the reason, and there will be no such fault; for this excludes those two triads from being correct reasons, since it is necessary that [the reason] be universally absent in the heterogeneous to be a correct reason. He further concluded: "Therefore, the three characteristics are established solely to elucidate the reason. For this reason, although all parts are capable of serving as the reason to elucidate the probandum, only one part is provisionally called the reason." Here, the words "therefore established" and "solely to" show that the three characteristics of the reason elucidate the proposition, and that the two examples are precisely the reason. Although both are the reason and elucidate the meaning of the proposition, among the three characteristics, only this one part—pervasion of the subject's property—is provisionally called the reason, while the other two are called examples. This is explained predominantly from the standpoint of preeminence, not as an exhaustive logical account; hence it is called "provisionally." The preceding text relied on this elucidating of the meaning of the proposition, so that stating the three characteristics of the reason is also not contradictory.