因明入正理論疏 2.168

2.168

述曰：此結不定。是因不但能成於聲，如瓶、盆等，是勤勇發；亦能成聲，如電、光等，非勤勇發。是故如前成二品故，亦為不定。此亦有三：如大乘師對薩婆多立他比量云：「汝執命根定非實有，許無緣慮故，如所許瓶等。」非實有宗，以瓶等為同品，無緣慮因，於彼遍有。以餘五蘊、無為為異品，無緣慮因於彼一分色等上有，心、心所無，故是他異分同全。大乘若云：「我之藏識是異熟識，許識性故，如異熟六識。」異熟識宗，以異熟六識而為同品，許識性因於此遍有。以除異熟六識，餘一切法而為異品，許識性因於彼一分非業果心有，於彼一分色等上無，故是自異分同全。如前所說，勝軍論師成立「大乘真是佛語，兩俱極成非佛語所不攝故，如《增一》等。」亦是此過。此中佛語宗，以《增一》等而為同品，大、小乘兩俱極成非佛語所不攝因，於此遍有。以《發智》、《六足》等而為異品，兩俱極成非佛語所不攝因，於《發智》有，於《六足》無，以《發智論》等小乘自許亦是佛語，大乘不許，亦汝大乘及餘小乘兩俱極成非佛語所不攝故因，既於彼有，亦此因過攝。如論所陳，即是共異分同全。

Commentary: This concludes that it is inconclusive. This reason not only can establish sound—like jars, basins, and the like—as produced by effort; it can also establish sound—like lightning, flashes, and the like—as not produced by effort. Therefore, because, as before, it establishes both classes, it is also inconclusive. This also has three varieties: For example, a Mahāyāna master establishing an inference for the other against a Sarvāstivādin says: "The life-faculty you maintain is definitely not real, because you accept that it is devoid of cognition, like jars and the like accepted [by you]." In the thesis of "not being real," jars and the like are the homologues, and the reason "being devoid of cognition" is present throughout them. Taking the remaining five aggregates and the unconditioned as heterologues, the reason "being devoid of cognition" is present in one part thereof—matter and the like—and absent in mind and mental factors; therefore it is an inference for the other that occurs in a part of the heterologue and throughout the homologue. If a Mahāyānist says: "My ālayavijñāna is a vipākavijñāna, because I accept that it has the nature of consciousness, like the six vipākavijñānas." In the thesis of "being a vipākavijñāna," the six vipākavijñānas are the homologues, and the reason "accepting that it has the nature of consciousness" is present throughout them. Taking all other phenomena apart from the six vipākavijñānas as heterologues, the reason "accepting that it has the nature of consciousness" is present in one part thereof—minds that are not karmic fruits—and absent in one part thereof—matter and the like; therefore it is an inference for oneself that occurs in a part of the heterologue and throughout the homologue. As explained previously, Master Jayasena's establishment: "The Mahāyāna is truly the Buddha's word, because it is not subsumed under what is mutually established by both to be non-Buddha's word, like the Ekottara-āgama and so forth," also suffers from this fallacy. Here, in the thesis of "Buddha's word," the Ekottara-āgama and so forth are the homologues, and the reason "not subsumed under what is mutually established by both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna to be non-Buddha's word" is present throughout them. Taking the Jñānaprasthāna, the Ṣaṭpādābhidharma, and so forth as heterologues, the reason "not subsumed under what is mutually established by both to be non-Buddha's word" is present in the Jñānaprasthāna and absent in the Ṣaṭpādābhidharma, because the Jñānaprasthāna and the like are accepted by the Hīnayāna itself to be the Buddha's word but not accepted by the Mahāyāna, and since the reason "not subsumed under what is mutually established by both your Mahāyāna and other Hīnayānists to be non-Buddha's word" is present there, it is also subsumed under this fallacy of the reason. What is set forth in the treatise is an inference for both that occurs in a part of the heterologue and throughout the homologue.