因明入正理論疏 2.182

2.182

述曰：此乃聲生對勝論立，若對餘宗說所聞性，是前所說不共不定。勝論聲性，謂同異性，實、德、業三各別性故，本有而常。大有共有，非各別性，不名聲性。聲生說聲總有三類：一者響音，雖耳所聞，不能詮表，如近坑語，別有響聲。二者聲性，一一能詮，各有性類，離能詮外別有本常，不緣不覺，新生緣具方始可聞，不同勝論。三者能詮，離前二有，響及此二皆新生。響不能詮，今此新生聲是常住，以本有聲性為同品。兩宗雖異，並有聲性可聞且常住，故總為同喻，不應分別何者聲性。如立「無常，所作性因，瓶為同品」，豈應分別何者所作、何者無常？若繩輪所作，打破無常，聲無瓶有。若尋、伺所作，緣息無常，聲有瓶無。若爾，一切皆無因、喻。故知因、喻之法皆不應分別，由此聲生立量無過。若分別者，便成過類分別相似。

Commentary: This is the Śabdakāryavādin establishing against the Vaiśeṣika. If one stated audibility against other schools, it would be the uncommon inconclusive reason mentioned earlier. The Vaiśeṣika sound-universal refers to the sāmānya-viśeṣa; because substance, quality, and action each have their separate universal nature, it is primordial and permanent. The great universal (bhāva) is common to all and is not a distinct specific nature, so it is not called sound-universal. The Śabdakāryavādin states that sound has three categories in total: First, echo-sound, which, although heard by the ear, cannot express meaning, like words spoken near a pit, having a separate echo sound. Second, the sound-universal; every single expressive word has its own generic nature, and apart from the expressive word there is a separate, primordially permanent [sound-universal]; if not cognized, it is not perceived, and only when newly arisen conditions are complete can it be heard—unlike the Vaiśeṣika view. Third, expressive words, which exist apart from the previous two; echoes and these two are all newly arisen. Echoes cannot express meaning; now these newly arisen sounds are permanent, taking the primordially existing sound-universal as the homologue. Although the two schools differ, both maintain that the sound-universal is audible and permanent, so it serves generally as a homologous example; one should not differentiate which sound-universal it is. Just as when establishing "[Sound is] impermanent, because it is produced, with jars as the homologue," how should one differentiate what kind of producedness or what kind of impermanence it is? If it is produced by cord and potter's wheel, with impermanence caused by breaking, sound lacks this while jars have it. If it is produced by vitarka and vicāra, with impermanence caused by the cessation of conditions, sound has this while jars lack it. If that were so, all would lack reason and example. Hence we know that the properties of the reason and the example should not be so differentiated; therefore the proof formulated by the Śabdakāryavādin is free from fallacy. If one differentiates them, it becomes the fallacy of false equalization through differentiation (vikalpasamā jāti).