因明入正理論疏 2.61

2.61

述曰：自下第二隨列指法，同前科列，此中簡持，唯且明一。現量體者，立敵親證法自相智，以相成宗，本符智境，立宗已乖正智，令智那得會真？耳為現體，彼此極成。聲為現得，本來共許。今隨何宗所立，但言聲非所聞？便違立、敵證智，故名現量相違。此有全分、一分四句。全四句者，有違自現非他，如勝論師對大乘云：「同異、大有，非五根得。」彼宗自許現量得故。雖此亦有違教、相符，今者但彰違自現量。有違他現非自，如佛弟子對勝論云：「覺、樂、欲、瞋非我現境。」彼宗說為我現得故。雖有此自，能別不成。今此但取違他現量。有違共現，謂論所陳，一切皆許聲所聞故。雖此亦有違教、世間，今者但取違共現量。有俱不違，如前所說聲是無常。一分四句者，有違自一分現非他。如勝論立「一切四大非眼根境」，彼說風大及三極微非眼根得，三麁可得；今說一切，違自一分。雖此亦有違教等失，今取違現。有違他一分現非自，如佛弟子對勝論云：「地、水、火三非眼所見。」彼說麁三是眼所見，極微非見，故違一分。有俱違一分現，如勝論師對佛弟子立「色香味皆非眼見」。唯色眼見，彼此共知，餘皆非見，名違共一分。雖此亦有一分違自教、世間、相符，今者但取俱違一分。俱不違一分者，如佛弟子對數論云：「自性、我體皆轉變無常。」雖違彼教，非現量故。此二四句中，違他及俱不違並非過攝。立宗本欲違害他故，違他非過，況俱不違？違自及共皆是過收。現、比量等，立義之具，今既違之，無所准憑，依何立義？論中指法依共全違，例餘諸句令皆准悉。此初示法略顯方隅，下陳過中非無餘過。既止繁議，皆應准解。

The Commentary explains: From here on, the second [part] successively lists and points to the fallacies, following the preceding division. Here, to clarify specifically, we first explain just one. As for the essence of perception (pratyakṣa), it is the cognition through which the proponent and opponent directly witness the unique characteristic (svalakṣana) of things; using [such] characteristics to establish a proposition (pratijñā) should fundamentally correspond to the sphere of cognition. If the stated proposition has already diverged from correct cognition, how could cognition be brought into accord with reality? That the ear is the perceptual organ is mutually recognized (ubhaya-siddha) by both parties. That sound is perceptually apprehended has always been commonly accepted. Now, whichever school sets it forth, if one merely asserts, "Sound is not audible," this directly contradicts the witnessing cognition of both the proponent and opponent; hence it is called "contradiction with perception" (pratyakṣa-viruddha). This has four alternatives (catuṣkoṭi) in both a total and a partial sense. Regarding the four total alternatives: There is contradiction of one's own perception and not the other's: as when a Vaiśeṣika says against the Mahāyāna, "Particularity-cum-universality (sāmānya-viśeṣa) and great existence (bhāva) are not apprehended by the five sense faculties." This is because their own school admits them to be apprehended by perception. Although this also contains the fallacies of contradicting scripture and establishing what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), here we only point out the contradiction with one's own perception. There is contradiction of the other's perception and not one's own: as when a disciple of the Buddha says against a Vaiśeṣika, "Cognition, pleasure, desire, and hatred are not perceptual objects of the self." This is because their school claims that these are perceptually apprehended by the self. Although this involves the fallacy of an unestablished qualification (viśeṣaṇa-asiddha) for oneself, here we only take it as contradicting the other's perception. There is contradiction of common perception: that is, what is presented in the treatise, because everyone accepts that sound is audible. Although this also contains the fallacies of contradicting scripture and the world, here we only take it as contradicting common perception. There is non-contradiction of both: as stated before, "Sound is impermanent." Regarding the four partial alternatives: There is contradiction of one's own partial perception and not the other's: as when a Vaiśeṣika posits, "All four great elements are not objects of the visual faculty." They claim that the wind element and the three subtle atoms are not apprehended by the visual faculty, but the gross three are apprehensible; now stating "all" contradicts their own partial [perception]. Although this also has faults such as contradicting scripture, we here take it as contradicting perception. There is contradiction of the other's partial perception and not one's own: as when a disciple of the Buddha says against a Vaiśeṣika, "The three [elements of] earth, water, and fire are not seen by the eye." They claim that the gross three are seen by the eye, while the subtle atoms are not seen; hence it contradicts their partial [perception]. There is contradiction of both parties' partial perception: as when a Vaiśeṣika posits against a disciple of the Buddha, "Visible form, smell, and taste are all not seen by the eye." Only visible form is seen by the eye, as is commonly known by both, while the rest are not seen; this is called contradicting a shared part. Although this also involves partial contradiction with one's own scripture, worldly consensus, and proving what is already accepted, here we only take the contradiction of both parties' partial [perception]. As for non-contradiction of both parties' partial [perception]: as when a disciple of the Buddha says against a Sāṃkhya, "Both primordial nature (prakṛti) and the self (puruṣa) are transformed and impermanent." Although this contradicts their scripture, it does not contradict perception. Among these two sets of four alternatives, contradicting the other and not contradicting both are not subsumed under fallacies. Because positing a proposition fundamentally seeks to contradict and defeat the other, contradicting the other is not a fallacy, let alone not contradicting both. Contradicting oneself and contradicting both are subsumed under fallacies. Perception, inference, and the like are the instruments for establishing a thesis; now that one contradicts them, having nothing to rely upon, on what basis can the thesis be established? The treatise's pointing to the fallacy is based on total contradiction of both, and the remaining alternatives should all be understood by analogy. This initial demonstration of the fallacy briefly reveals its general outlines; in the subsequent statements of fallacies, other fallacies are not absent. To avoid cumbersome discussion, all should be understood by analogy.