因明入正理論疏 2.88

2.88

今佛弟子對數論師立聲滅壞，有法之聲彼此雖許，滅壞宗法他所不成，世間無故。總無別依，應更須立，非真宗故，是故為失。如是等義皆如上說。此有全分、一分四句。全四句者，有自能別不成非他，如數論師對佛弟子云：「色、聲等五，藏識現變。」有法色等雖此共成，藏識變現自宗非有。有他能別不成非自，如論所陳，立聲滅壞。有俱能別不成，如數論師對佛弟子說「色等五德句所收」，彼此世間無德攝故。一分四句者，有自一分能別不成非他。如薩婆多對大乘者說「所造色大種，藏識二法所生」，一分藏識自宗無故。有他一分能別不成非自，如佛弟子對數論師立「耳等根滅壞有易」，有易彼宗可有，一分滅壞無故。有俱一分能別不成，如勝論師對佛弟子立「色等五皆從同類及自性生」，同類所生兩皆許有，自性所起兩皆無故。此二四句唯俱成是，餘皆非攝。論說於他全分不成，餘皆准悉。

Now, when a Buddhist disciple advances [the proposition] to a Sāṃkhya master that sound is perishable, sound as the subject (dharmin) is indeed admitted by both, but perishability as the predicate (dharma) of the thesis is not established for the other, because it does not exist in the world [according to them]. Since the locus of qualification as a whole is absent, it would have to be established further; it is not a genuine thesis, and is therefore a flaw. Such points have all been explained above. Here there are four alternatives for the whole and four for the partial. Among the four whole alternatives: There is where the predicate is unestablished for oneself and not for the other, such as when a Sāṃkhya master says to a Buddhist disciple: 'The five [objects], form, sound, and so forth, are manifestations of the ālayavijñāna.' Although the subject, form and so forth, is mutually established, the manifestation of the ālayavijñāna does not exist in one's own system. There is where the predicate is unestablished for the other and not for oneself, as stated in the treatise, putting forward that sound is perishable. There is where the predicate is unestablished for both, such as when a Sāṃkhya master says to a Buddhist disciple: 'Form and the other five are subsumed under the category of quality (guṇa-padārtha),' because neither accepts in the world that they are subsumed under quality. Among the four partial alternatives: There is where the predicate is partially unestablished for oneself and not for the other, such as when a Sarvāstivādin says to a Mahāyānist: 'Derived matter and the primary elements are generated by the two dharmas, [matter] and ālayavijñāna,' since a part, the ālayavijñāna, is absent in one's own system. There is where the predicate is partially unestablished for the other and not for oneself, such as when a Buddhist disciple advances to a Sāṃkhya master: 'The ear and other faculties perish and undergo change,' for change can exist in their system, but the part consisting of perishing does not exist. There is where the predicate is partially unestablished for both, such as when a Vaiśeṣika advances to a Buddhist disciple: 'The five [objects], form and so forth, all arise from homogenous causes (sabhāga) and from prakṛti,' since arising from homogenous causes is accepted by both, but arising from prakṛti is absent for both. In these two sets of four alternatives, only mutual establishment is correct, and all the rest are unaccepted. The treatise speaks of what is wholly unestablished for the other; the rest should be understood by analogy.