因明入正理論疏 2.90

2.90

述曰：即前數論立神我諦，體為受者，由我思用五塵諸境，自性便變二十三諦，故我是思。是思宗法，彼此共成，佛法有思是心所故。唯有法我，佛之弟子多分不立，除正量等餘皆無故，理如前說。此有全分、一分四句。全四句者，有自所別不成非他，如佛弟子對數論言「我是無常」，是無常法彼此許有。有法神我自所不成，今此有法不標汝執，故是宗過，有簡便無。有他所別不我非自，如數論者立「我是思」。有俱所別不成，如薩婆多對大眾部立「神我實有」，實有可有，我兩無故。一分四句者，有自一分所別不成非他，如佛弟子對數論言：「我及色等皆性是空。」色等許有，我自無故，宗無簡別，為過如前。有他一分所別不成非自，如數論師對佛弟子立「我、色等皆並實有」，佛法不許有我體故。有俱一分所別不成，如薩婆多對化地部說「我去來皆是實有」，世可俱有，我俱無故。此二四句唯俱不違非是過攝，餘皆是過。論說他全所別不成，餘皆准悉。

Commentary: This refers to the previous Sāṃkhya establishing the principle of the puruṣa, whose substance is the experiencer: because the self thinks upon and uses the five dust-objects and other realms, prakṛti transforms into the twenty-three principles, and thus the self is consciousness. That it is consciousness is a predicate of the thesis mutually established by both, because in the Buddha's teaching there is thinking, which is a mental factor (caitta). But as for the subject, the self, the majority of Buddhist disciples do not accept it, because except for the Sāṃmitīya and others, the rest maintain it does not exist, the reasoning being as explained before. Here there are four alternatives for the whole and four for the partial. Among the four whole alternatives: There is where the subject is unestablished for oneself and not for the other, such as when a Buddhist disciple says to a Sāṃkhya: 'The self is impermanent.' That things are impermanent is admitted by both. The subject, the puruṣa, is not established for oneself; here, since this subject is not marked with [the qualification] 'in your assertion,' it is a flaw in the thesis; if there were a qualification, there would be no flaw. There is where the subject is unestablished for the other and not for oneself, such as when a Sāṃkhya establishes: 'The self is consciousness.' There is where the subject is unestablished for both, such as when a Sarvāstivādin establishes against a Mahāsāṃghika: 'The puruṣa is real.' Real existence can be accepted, but the self is absent for both. Among the four partial alternatives: There is where the subject is partially unestablished for oneself and not for the other, such as when a Buddhist disciple says to a Sāṃkhya: 'The self, form, and so forth are all empty by nature.' Form and so forth are admitted to exist, but the self is absent for oneself; since the thesis lacks qualification, it is a flaw as before. There is where the subject is partially unestablished for the other and not for oneself, such as when a Sāṃkhya master advances to a Buddhist disciple: 'The self, form, and so forth are all substantially existent,' because the Buddha's teaching does not admit the substance of a self. There is where the subject is partially unestablished for both, such as when a Sarvāstivādin says to a Mahīśāsaka: 'My past and future are both substantially existent.' The time-periods may exist for both, but the 'I' is absent for both. In these two sets of four alternatives, only what is uncontradicted by both is not included in the flaws; all the rest are flaws. The treatise speaks of a subject wholly unestablished for the other; the rest should be understood by analogy.