因明入正理論疏 3.125

3.125

述曰：下明能立無。淮所立有，亦應言彼立極微有質礙故，文影略爾。此中亦有兩俱、隨一、猶預、無依不遣。或無第四過，以異喻體但遮非表，依無非過，但有前三。或亦有四，如立我無，許諦攝故，異喻如空，對無空論雖無所依，亦不遣其所立法故。此論所明，聲對勝論兩俱不遣；若對薩婆多隨一不遣，薩婆多計微非常故。猶預不遣者，如言彼山等處定應有火，以現烟故，如餘厨等處。異喻諸無火處皆不現烟，如餘處等。然有火處亦無其烟，故懷猶預，不現烟處火為有無，故猶預不遣。《維摩經》說「如無烟火，如燋穀芽。」今據顯相故無違也。然隨所應，有自、他、共，全分、一分等。

The Commentary states: Next is explaining the absence of the probans. By analogy with the presence of the probandum, it should also say, 'for they assert that an atom has corporeal obstruction'; the text is simply compressed. Here too there are [distinctions of non-exclusion] for both, for one party, doubtful, and without support. Or, the fourth fallacy is absent, because the substance of a heterogeneous example is merely exclusive and not affirmative, so the absence of a substratum is not a fallacy, leaving only the former three. Or, there are also four: as when establishing 'the self is nonexistent, because it is admitted to be subsumed under truth', with the heterogeneous example 'like space'—against the school that denies space, although there is no substratum, it still does not fail to exclude its established property. What this treatise explains is non-exclusion for both when a Śābda argues against a Vaiśeṣika; if against a Sarvāstivādin, it is non-exclusion for one party, because the Sarvāstivādin holds that atoms are not eternal. As for doubtful non-exclusion, it is like saying: 'That mountain and so forth must certainly possess fire, because smoke is observed, like another kitchen and so forth.' The heterogeneous example would be: 'Wherever there is no fire, no smoke is observed, like other places and so forth.' Yet places with fire can also lack smoke; therefore, doubt arises as to whether fire is present or absent in places where smoke is not observed, and thus there is doubtful non-exclusion. The Vimalakīrti-sūtra says, 'like fire without smoke, like scorched grain sprouts.' Here it is based on the conspicuous characteristics, so there is no contradiction. However, according to what is applicable, there are distinctions of one's own, the other's, both, total, partial, and so forth.