因明入正理論疏 3.14

3.14

問：「如聲論言，汝聲無常，應非是聲無常，所作性故，如瓶、盆等。第二正因豈非有法自相相違？」答：「彼非過收。如立聲無常，無常為法自相；若所立因，返成聲常，可是此過。今者雙牒有法及法為法、有法，故非此過，此乃但是分別相似過類。因犯兩俱不成，所作性因，立、敵不許依無常故，生、滅異故。設彼許依，亦犯隨一。又無常無能依所作性，亦犯所依不成過故。設有難言：汝聲無常，應非是聲無常，許無常故，如瓶無常。此亦非過，諸似立無此過相故。聲有無常是根本諍，聲是有法，非是法上意所許義，不可說為法差別過。亦非相違決定所收，非根本諍故。設許上說皆為過者，即一切量無正因者，故於似立不見其過，皆是似破，至下當知。」

Question: "As the Grammarian (Śabdika) says: 'Your sound's impermanence should not be sound's impermanence, because of being produced, like a pot, a basin, etc.' Is not this second valid reason contradictory to the own-nature of the subject (dharmin-svabhāva-viparīta-sādhana)?" Answer: "That is not included as a fault. As when establishing that sound is impermanent, impermanence is the own-nature of the property; if the established reason turns out to establish that sound is permanent, it can be this fault. Now, citing both subject and property as property and subject, it is therefore not this fault; this is merely the category of futile objections through differentiation (jāti). The reason commits the fallacy of being unestablished for both (ubhaya-asiddha), because the reason 'being produced' is not accepted by either proponent or opponent to reside in impermanence, due to the difference between arising and ceasing. Even if they accepted it to reside therein, it would also commit the fallacy of being unestablished for one party (anyatara-asiddha). Furthermore, impermanence has no 'being produced' as something residing upon it; hence it also commits the fault of having an unestablished substratum (āśraya-asiddha). If someone were to object: 'Your sound's impermanence should not be sound's impermanence, because impermanence is accepted, like the impermanence of a pot.' This is also not a fault, because fallacious proofs do not possess this mark of fault. That sound has impermanence is the fundamental dispute; sound is the subject, not the intended meaning upon the property, so it cannot be called the fault of the particular property of the property. Nor is it included under the inconclusive through contradiction (viruddhāvyabhicārin), because it is not the fundamental dispute. If it were admitted that all the above statements were faults, then in all inferences there would be no valid reason; therefore, no fault is seen in the fallacious thesis, but all are fallacious refutations (dūṣaṇābhāsa), as will be understood below."