因明入正理論疏 3.165

3.165

問：「空、無我等，此之共相為有體無？」有云：有體，即此色等非我、我所，名空、無我等故，非境無故。《成唯識》云：「非異非不異，如無常等性。」又云：「若無體者，如何與行非異耶？」今謂不爾，若言即此色等非我、我所，名空、無我，故說非無，即應與色等是一而非異，如何非一異？又違五十二解云證緣無識。一、緣無我觀智。二、緣飲食，飲食即香等，離色、香等都無所有。三、邪見緣無。四、又諸行中無常無恒不實共相觀，識非不緣此。五、緣去來生滅等。既引證緣無，明知此無體，且止傍論。

Question: "Do sāmānyalakṣaṇas such as emptiness and non-self have substantial reality or not?" Some say: They have substantial reality, because this very matter and so forth not being a self or belonging to a self is called emptiness, non-self, and so on; it is not that the object does not exist. The Cheng weishi lun states: "Neither different nor non-different, like the nature of impermanence and so forth." It also states: "If it lacked substantial entity, how could it be non-different from conditioned formations?" We now say this is not so. If one says that this very matter and so forth not being a self or belonging to a self is called emptiness and non-self, and therefore says it is not non-existent, then it should be identical to matter and so forth, rather than different—how could it be neither identical nor different? Furthermore, it contradicts the explanation in Fascicle 52 corroborating the consciousness that cognizes non-existence: first, the contemplative wisdom cognizing non-self; second, cognizing food and drink, where food and drink are just fragrance and so on, and apart from visible form, fragrance, and so forth, nothing at all exists; third, wrong views cognizing non-existence; fourth, the contemplative consciousness regarding the sāmānyalakṣaṇas of impermanence, non-eternality, and unreality among conditioned formations, which is not without cognizing this; fifth, cognizing past, future, arising, ceasing, and so forth. Since these are cited to corroborate the cognition of non-existence, we clearly know that this lacks substantial entity. But let us stop this digression.