因明入正理論疏 3.202

3.202

或此中意約三分明。能量見分，量果自證分，體不離用，即智名果，是能證彼見分相故。相謂行相、體相，非相分名相。如有作用而顯現者，簡異正量。彼心取境，如日舒光，如鉗鉗物，親照境故。今者大乘依自證分，起此見分取境功能，及彼相分為境生識，是和緣假，如有作用。自證能起，故言而顯現，故不同彼執直實取。此自證分亦名為量，亦彼見分。或此相分亦名為量，不離能量故，如色言唯識，此順陳那三分義解。

Or the intention here may be explained in terms of the three parts: the cognising instrument is the vision-part (darśanabhāga); the result of cognition is the self-verifying part (svasaṃvittibhāga). Substance is not separate from function, so cognition itself is called the result, because it is capable of verifying the mark of that vision-part. 'Mark' (ākāra) means the cognitive aspect (ākāra) or intrinsic aspect (svabhāvākāra), not what is called the objective-part (nimittabhāga). The phrase 'appearing as though having activity' is used to differentiate it from an [externalist] valid cognition. In their view, the mind grasps an object just as the sun radiates light or as pincers grasp an object, directly illuminating the object. Now, in the Mahāyāna, relying on the self-verifying part, there arises this capacity of the vision-part to grasp an object, and that objective-part serves as the cognitive object producing consciousness; this is a conceptual designation based on a harmonious confluence of conditions, as though there were an activity. Since within a single mind the cogniser and cognised are distinguished conceptually, the result of cognition is also called a cognition (pramāṇa). Alternatively, because that which is cognised appears directly in the mind and is not separate from the mind, it is also called a cognition, for the object is also mind, explained according to the two parts. This conforms to Diṅnāga's explanation of the three parts.