因明入正理論疏 3.68

3.68

述曰：此釋能立無。此聲、勝論計微質礙，故無能立。問：「因為成宗，因有兩俱、隨一等過。喻亦成宗，何故但名能立不成，不明餘耶？」答：「因親成宗，故有四過；喻是助成，故無四過。又解：因是初相，據初辯四，顯第二相亦有四種，彼開此合，義實相似。以喻准因亦有四種：一、兩俱不成，即論說是。隨一不成，彼聲論師對佛弟子立聲常宗，無質礙因，舉喻如業。佛法不許，即是隨一。雖俱所立無，且辯能立隨一。猶預不成，准理有二：一宗、二因，前已具顯。今喻亦二，於中綺互，或因猶預非喻能立，或喻能立非因猶預，或俱猶預，或俱不猶預。前三是過，第四非過。因猶預非喻能立者，如於霧等性起疑惑時為烟為霧，即立彼處定應有火，以現烟故，如厨舍等處。或指如餘疑惑因喻，舉一例餘，即可思准。或可因是宗法，有法猶預，因亦成過，如厨等現烟，立、敵俱決定，何成猶預？又解：因具三相，二喻即因，既第二相，何非猶預？能立所依不成者，不同於因有第二、三相，無宗有法，但闕初相。此所依無，能立亦無，然亦得名無能立所依不成。如數論師對佛弟子立思受用諸法宗，以是神我故，如眼等根。若言假我，因喻無過；今言以是神我故因，佛法不許，故隨一無。此因既無，故喻無依。此約依因，或喻所依無，名所依不成。且約依因，如下更解。然有說言：謂所立既成，必有所依，故無第四不成之過。今謂不爾，為依於彼所立之宗？為依喻上所立無常？若依所立，因、喻相似，喻依因不依，故知不可。若依喻上所立無常者，此非喻依，喻依依極微故，亦復不可。又縱有所立，不立第四過。或若所立無，第四豈不立？設雙依彼有法及法，如俱不成，豈無此過？若言即依因，如闕宗因，豈無此過？」

The Commentary says: This explains the absence of the means of proof. Here, both the Śābda and Vaiśeṣika maintain that atoms are material, hence the means of proof is absent. Question: 'Because the reason is for establishing the thesis, the reason has the fallacies of being unestablished for both (ubhaya-asiddha), unestablished for one (anyatara-asiddha), and so on. The example also establishes the thesis; why is it only called unestablished means of proof (sādhanavikala), without clarifying the rest?' Answer: 'The reason directly establishes the thesis, so it has four fallacies [of asiddha]; the example is an auxiliary establishment, so it does not have the four fallacies.' Another explanation: 'The reason is the first characteristic (rūpa); analyzing four on the basis of the first reveals that the second characteristic also has four kinds. That [reason] opens them up and this [example] combines them, but their meaning is truly similar. By analogy of the example to the reason, there are also four kinds: 1. Unestablished for both (ubhaya-asiddha), which is what the treatise states. As for unestablished for one (anyatara-asiddha), that Śābda master, against a Buddhist disciple, establishes the thesis that sound is eternal with the reason of being immaterial, and adduces the example of action (karman). The Buddhist does not accept it, so it is unestablished for one. Although in both cases the probandum is absent, we provisionally analyze the unestablished means of proof for one. As for doubtful lack (saṃdigdha-sādhanavikala), according to logic there are two: first, the thesis; second, the reason; these were already fully shown before. Now the example also has two, and among them there is an alternating combination: either the reason is doubtful and not the example's means of proof, or the example's means of proof is doubtful and not the reason, or both are doubtful, or neither is doubtful. The first three are fallacious; the fourth is not fallacious. As for the reason being doubtful and not the example's means of proof: for instance, when doubt arises regarding the nature of mist and the like, whether it is smoke or mist, one then establishes that that place must definitely have fire because smoke is observed, like a kitchen or other places. Or pointing to other doubtful reasons and examples: by adducing one as an instance for the rest, it can be understood accordingly. Or it may be that because the reason is a property of the subject of the thesis (pakṣa-dharma), if the subject (dharmin) is doubtful, the reason also becomes fallacious; as with smoke appearing in a kitchen and the like, both the proponent and opponent are determinate, so how could it become doubtful? Another explanation: the reason possesses three characteristics, and the two examples are just the reason; since it is the second characteristic, how could it not be doubtful? As for lack of the substratum of the means of proof (āśrayāsiddha): unlike the reason which has the second and third characteristics, lacking the thesis's subject is only lacking the first characteristic. When this substratum is absent, the means of proof is also absent, yet it can also be named unestablished substratum lacking the means of proof. For instance, a Sāṃkhya master, against a Buddhist disciple, establishes the thesis: 'Thought experiences all phenomena, because it is the spiritual self (puruṣa), like the eye and other sense faculties.' If one says 'nominal self', the reason and example are without fallacy; now saying 'because it is the spiritual self' as the reason, the Buddhist does not accept it, so it is absent for one party. Since this reason is absent, the example lacks a substratum. This is in terms of relying on the reason; or, the example lacking a substratum is named unestablished substratum. We provisionally speak in terms of relying on the reason, as explained further below. However, some say: 'Since the probandum is already established, there must be a substratum, so there is no fourth fallacy of asiddha.' Now we say this is not so: does it rely on that probandum thesis, or does it rely on the probandum impermanence on the example? If it relies on the probandum, the reason and example are similar; the example would rely on it while the reason does not, so we know this is impermissible. If it relies on the probandum impermanence on the example, this is not the example's substratum, because the example's substratum relies on atoms, so this is also impermissible. Moreover, even if there were a probandum, that would not establish the absence of the fourth fallacy. Or if the probandum were absent, would the fourth not be established? Even if it relies on both that subject and property, as in the unestablished for both, how could it lack this fallacy? If one says it directly relies on the reason, just as lacking the thesis's reason, how could it lack this fallacy?'