因明入正理論疏 3.81

3.81

述曰：釋所立無，喻上常住實非所立，即同於彼。所立、能立二種法者，即是其喻，從所同為名，故名所立。准前能立亦有四種，即文所辯，兩俱不成。舉極微對佛法立，隨一不成。雖有餘過，且取所立以辯於過。猶預所立不成者，猶預亦二，綺互亦四，准前能立。如大乘人對薩婆多立預流等定有大乘種姓，然不定知此預流等有大乘姓不，故懷猶預。因云有情攝故，如餘有情。然餘有情亦懷猶預，不知定有大乘姓不。此俱猶預，餘者類思。

The Commentary says: Explaining the absence of the probandum: eternality on the example is in fact not the probandum, but it is identical to that [probandum of the thesis]. The two properties, the probandum and the means of proof, are precisely the example; it takes its name from what it shares similarity with, hence it is called the probandum. By analogy with the previous means of proof, there are also four kinds, which is what the text analyzes: unestablished for both. Adducing an atom in debate against Buddhism is unestablished for one. Although there are other fallacies, we provisionally take the probandum to analyze the fallacy. As for doubtful lack of the probandum (saṃdigdha-sādhyavikala): doubt also has two, and the alternating combinations also have four, by analogy with the previous means of proof. For example, a Mahāyāna adherent establishes against a Sarvāstivādin that stream-enterers (srotāpanna) and the like definitely possess the Mahāyāna gotra; however, not determinately knowing whether these stream-enterers and the like possess the Mahāyāna gotra or not, he harbors doubt. The reason says: 'because they are included among sentient beings, like other sentient beings.' However, regarding other sentient beings one also harbors doubt, not knowing whether they definitely possess the Mahāyāna gotra or not. This is doubt for both; the others may be inferred by analogy.