因明入正理論疏 3.94

3.94

問：「虛空體無，常可不有。空體非有，無礙豈無？」答：「立聲常宗，無質礙因，宗因俱表；虛空不有，故無礙無。《理門》但舉有喻所依，兩俱、隨一、猶預所依及喻無依皆略不明。准此有、無，有即初二，無即第四，或有或無即第三過。此有四句：一、宗因俱有體無俱不成，即對無空論是。二、宗因無體有俱不成，如數論師對薩婆多立思是我，以受用二十三諦故，如瓶盆等。三、宗因有體有俱不成，即論所說有俱不成是。四、宗因無體無俱不成，即前第二對佛法中無空論者，然此有兩俱、隨一、猶預及所依不成。初三各分於二，有及非有。且依有俱不成、兩俱不成，如論說是。隨一有二：一、自隨一，如外道立我能受苦、樂，以作業故，對佛法中無空論者，取空為同喻。二、他隨一有俱不成，如說聲常，無質礙故，對佛法者同喻如語業。猶預有俱不成者，如說彼厨等中定有火，以現畑故。如山等處，於霧等性既懷猶預，皆火有不決。山處是有，故成猶預有俱不成。所依不成者，喻依既有，闕無此句，若說依因宗即有此句，前四句中第二句是。前之四種，隨其所應亦有全分、一分，思准可知，恐繁不述。」

Question: "The entity of empty space is non-existent, so permanence may indeed not exist [there]. But even if the entity of empty space is non-existent, how could unobstructedness be absent?" Answer: "In establishing the thesis that sound is permanent by the reason of being unobstructed, both thesis and reason are affirmative (vidhi); since empty space does not exist, unobstructedness is absent. The Nyāyamukha only adduces [examples] having a substratum; both, either, and doubtful substrata, as well as an example without a substratum, are all omitted and not explained. According to this distinction of existent and non-existent: existent comprises the first two, non-existent comprises the fourth, and either existent or non-existent comprises the third fault. Here there are four permutations: 1. Thesis and reason both have an entity, but are 'non-existent both unestablished'—namely, against one who maintains that empty space does not exist. 2. Thesis and reason lack an entity, but are 'existent both unestablished'—such as when a Sāṃkhya establishes against a Sarvāstivādin that 'thought is the self, because it experiences the twenty-three principles, like a pot, basin, etc.' 3. Thesis and reason have an entity, and are 'existent both unestablished'—namely, the 'existent both unestablished' spoken of in the treatise. 4. Thesis and reason lack an entity, and are 'non-existent both unestablished'—namely, the previously mentioned second [case] against one who maintains that empty space does not exist within the Buddhadharma. However, in this there are [the varieties of] 'both,' 'either,' 'doubtful,' and 'substratum unestablished.' The first three each divide into two: existent and non-existent. First, regarding 'existent both unestablished' and 'both [parties] unestablished,' it is as the treatise explains. 'Either' has two: 1. 'Self-either'—as when an outsider establishes that 'the self can experience suffering and pleasure, because it performs actions,' against one who maintains that empty space does not exist within the Buddhadharma, taking empty space as a similar example. 2. 'Other-either existent both unestablished'—as when one says 'sound is permanent, because it is unobstructed,' against a Buddhist, with the similar example being vocal action. As for 'doubtful existent both unestablished'—as when one says, 'in that kitchen etc. there is definitely fire, because smoke is seen; like in a mountain etc.,' where, since one harbors doubt about the nature of the mist etc., the presence of fire in all of them is undetermined. The mountain location is existent, so it constitutes 'doubtful existent both unestablished.' As for 'substratum unestablished'—since the substratum of the example exists, this permutation is lacking; if one speaks of relying on the reason and the thesis, this permutation exists, which is the second permutation among the previous four. The previous four kinds also have whole and partial according to what is applicable; one can know this through reflection, so for fear of prolixity it is not set forth."