因明入正理論疏 3.96

3.96

問：「真如常有故說為常，虛空恒無，何非常住？又虛空無，何非無礙？」答：「立宗法略有二種：一者，但遮而無有表，如言我無，但欲遮我，不別立無，喻亦但遮而不取表。二、亦遮亦表，如說我常，非但遮無常，亦表有常體，喻即有遮、表。依前喻，無體有遮亦得成。依後，但有遮無表，二立闕。今立聲常，是有遮、表；對無空論，但有其遮而無有表，故是喻過。」

Question: "True Suchness (tathatā) is permanently existent, and is therefore called permanent; empty space is constantly non-existent, so why is it not permanently abiding? Furthermore, empty space is non-existent, so why is it not unobstructed?" Answer: "The properties of an established thesis are broadly of two kinds: First, merely exclusionary without being affirmative (pratiṣedha-mātra without vidhi)—as when saying 'the self is non-existent,' which only intends to exclude the self and does not separately establish non-existence; the example is also merely exclusionary and does not take an affirmative [sense]. Second, both exclusionary and affirmative—as when saying 'the self is permanent,' which not only excludes impermanence but also affirms an existent entity of permanence; the example then has both exclusion and affirmation. Relying on the former example, having exclusion without an entity is also established. Relying on the latter, having only exclusion without affirmation lacks both establishments. Now, establishing that sound is permanent is both exclusionary and affirmative; against one who maintains that empty space does not exist, it has only exclusion and no affirmation, and therefore it is an error of the example."