因明義斷 1.11

1.11

有人云：先釋即不共許，是所立法。所作性因，彼此極成，即能立法。故無常法正是所立。此解雖爾，未是通途。所以然者？且如立聲無常一量，可如所說，以為所諍。若依有性等量，豈得以非實為所立法耶？本意諍有法大有性非實即實等。其義云何？答：應此共思。若本諍有法不諍法者，言非實等，為是有法？為當法耶？若是有法，即應先陳。若其是法，不為所諍，言法何為？又以何為極成有法？極成能別，差別為宗。若言彼據諍其法說，若諍有法，何為能所別？不可將有法為能別故，以先陳故。又若有法正是所諍，一切諍有法皆無同喻過。又法不成有法故。又復不可大有非實俱是所諍，無極成有法，依何立宗？又若大有正所諍，所成之宗即合名法。故《理門》云「又於此中觀所成故，立法、有法。」故知還以非實等為法，即是所諍。廣其所以，如本疏釋。准彼，既無別解，舊釋故合通途。及解大有為法有法，會《理門論》，皆如本疏及別抄釋。

Someone says: The former explanation is that what is not mutually accepted is the sādhya-dharma. The hetu of being produced is prasiddha to both parties; this is the sādhaka-dharma. Therefore the dharma of impermanence is precisely the sādhya. Although this explanation is so, it is not a universally applicable path. Why is that? Take, for example, positing the single anumāna that sound is impermanent: it can be as stated, taken as what is in dispute. But if one relies on an anumāna such as the existence-property (bhāva), how could "not being a substance" (adravya) be taken as the sādhya-dharma? The original intention was to dispute whether the dharmin, the universal existence-property (mahābhāva), is not a substance or is a substance, and so forth. How is this meaning to be understood? Answer: One should consider this together. If originally one disputes the dharmin and does not dispute the dharma, then when speaking of "not being a substance" and so forth, is it the dharmin or is it the dharma? If it is the dharmin, then it should be stated first. If it is the dharma and is not what is in dispute, why mention the dharma? Moreover, what would serve as the prasiddha dharmin? With a prasiddha predicate (viśeṣaṇa), the difference is the pratijñā. If one says that it is stated on the basis of disputing the dharma, then if one disputes the dharmin, what would serve as the predicate and the subject? One cannot take the dharmin as the predicate, because it is stated first. Furthermore, if the dharmin were precisely what is in dispute, all disputes concerning a dharmin would suffer the doṣa of having no sapakṣa-udāharaṇa. Furthermore, the dharma cannot establish the dharmin. Moreover, it is impossible that both the universal existence and non-substance are what is in dispute; without a prasiddha dharmin, on what would the pratijñā be posited? Furthermore, if the universal existence were precisely what is in dispute, the pratijñā that is established should be called the dharma. Therefore the *Nyāyamukha* says: "Furthermore, herein, observing what is to be established, one posits the dharma and the dharmin." Therefore we know that one still takes "not being a substance" and so forth as the dharma, which is precisely what is in dispute. The extensive reasons for this are as explained in the root commentary. Following that, since there is no alternative explanation, the old explanation indeed accords with the universal path. And as for explaining universal existence as dharma or dharmin, and reconciling it with the *Nyāyamukha*, all are as explained in the root commentary and the separate notes.