因明義斷 1.19

1.19

有人云：若據似因說遍非宗法者，即不定因是。其義云何？答：此亦不然。既遍在宗，何非宗法？若云不正不名宗法者，云何《理門》九句俱云宗法？又若初相中兼簡餘相過，可得云非宗法。遍是宗法性但顯初相，既遍有法，何非法性？若言要是正因方名遍是宗法性者，但說遍是宗法性，即是已簡過盡，何須更說同品定有等？又雖遍於宗，有不定故，非宗法者，即應言正是宗法性，何須遍言？遍言不能離諸過故。若言以遍不能離過故，須更言是宗法性。即應云正，正能離過故，無有正非宗法者。即唯一句，已辨正因，不勞煩語。既不作是說，故知遍是宗法性但顯初相。故《理門》云「雖一切分皆能為因，顯了所立。然唯一分，且說為因。」既說且言，明非具簡。

Someone says: 'If one speaks of pervading but not being a property of the subject on the basis of a semblance of a reason, that is the indeterminate reason.' What is the truth of this matter? Answer: This also is not so. Since it pervades the thesis, how could it not be a property of the subject? If one says that what is incorrect is not called a property of the subject, why do all nine clauses of the *Nyāyamukha* call it a property of the subject? Furthermore, if in the first mark one concurrently excluded the fallacies of the other marks, one could say it is not a property of the subject. "The property of being present in the subject as a whole" only manifests the first mark; since it pervades the dharmin, how could it not be the property-nature? If one says that it is named "the property of being present in the subject as a whole" only when it is a correct reason, then merely stating "the property of being present in the subject as a whole" would already exclude all fallacies completely; why would one further need to state "definitely present in the sapakṣa" and so on? Furthermore, if, although pervading the thesis, it is not a property of the subject because it is indeterminate, then one ought to say "the property of being correctly [present in] the subject"; why would one need the word "whole"? The word "whole" cannot eliminate all fallacies. If one says that because "whole" cannot eliminate fallacies, one must further say "the property of being [present in] the subject", then one should say "correct", because "correct" can eliminate fallacies, and there would be nothing correct that is not a property of the subject. Then a single phrase would already differentiate the correct reason, without troublesome words. Since it does not state this, we know that "the property of being present in the subject as a whole" only manifests the first mark. Hence the *Nyāyamukha* says: 'Although all parts can serve as the reason to make the sadhya manifest, nevertheless only one part is provisionally spoken of as the reason.' Since it uses the word "provisionally", it is clear that it does not completely exclude [all fallacies].